THEOLOGY

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EDITORIAL

The season of Advent is an instructive example of the way in which the Church leads the world. It is notorious that more and more each year the shops bid us prepare ourselves for Christmas a long time before it comes. The Christmas numbers of periodicals appear in the autumn. The Postmaster-General implores us to Post Early. Unintelligent or shy people fill up an awkward gap in the conversation by remarking that Christmas will be upon us before we are aware of it. And all the time the poor things are only imitating what has long been the practice of the Church. Not, it seems, quite always. Advent dates only from the sixth century. There was a time, as we learn from that mine of information *Liturgy and Worship*, when the Christian Year began on December 25. This was in order to avoid the heathen First of January. Then Advent, sometimes known as St. Martin's Lent and beginning on November 11, established itself as the true exordium of the Liturgical Year. As such, it has really been accepted. As a shrewd observer once remarked, whereas it used to be thought that Religion began with the First chapter of Genesis, we know now that it begins with the First Sunday in Advent. Thus, when on that Sunday morning the vicar beams on his congregation and wishes them a Happy New Year, nobody is surprised. It is, after all, only an extension of the good custom by which every Sunday begins on Saturday evening, and Feasts have Vigils.

Among the liturgical passages appointed for use on Christmas Eve is this at None:

> To-morrow: ye shall have help,
> Saith the Lord of hosts.

Saul's encouraging message to the men of Jabesh-Gilead (1 Sam. xi. 9) has taken on a richer meaning. The meaning is in fact so rich that one Vigil is not nearly enough. Just as the Nativity was so earth-shaking an event that not till the fourth century was the theological significance of it at all completely analyzed, and even now it is very far from being completely understood, so even the annual observance of the Feast of the Nativity is a thing so momentous that we must begin four weeks beforehand to get ready for it.

It is sometimes thought that those who would expound the lesson of Advent must choose between two different thoughts, the Incarnation and Judgment. The Book of Common Prayer does not think so. The Christmas Day Gospel finds in the Nativity at Bethlehem only the fruition of what was determined in the creation of the world. The Advent Sunday passages declare that "the Lord is at hand" in at least two senses of the word. It is indeed at first sight remarkable that the Advent Sunday Gospel should bring before us the event of Palm Sunday. But "Blessed be he that cometh in the name of the Lord" is a cry that refuses to be limited to any one time. Plummer expounds its use in Luke xiii. 35 (a different context) as referring to "the conversion of the Jews throughout all time." It might perhaps be said that the teaching of Advent and Christmas together is that in the history of the world there are three chapters, which are inaugurated by the Creation, the Incarnation, and the Judgment or New Creation.

The idea of Judgment is not popular with the world, and there is a certain difficulty in using aright the traditional Bible language. "When He shall come again in His glorious Majesty to judge the quick and the dead." What does it mean? How much of it is pictorial imagery, like the throne set and the books opened, which is necessary if there is to be a description at all and yet is not to be applied to establish any doctrine, and how much is indestructible truth? The central core of the conception seems to be a revelation from on high that it matters what we do. God cares. It is incompatible with truth that God should treat black as white or white as black. The value of each human life is being perpetually constructed, and must when it is completed be summed up. Then he that is righteous shall be righteous still, and he that is filthy shall be filthy still. This is Judgment. It is, of course, at work already. Acts seen against the background of the Life of our Lord are being judged. "This is the judgment, that the light is come into

the world, and men loved the darkness rather than the light; for their works were evil." But at present they are seen against the background of a Life whose purpose is to save rather than to judge. It judges, but its purpose is to save. How great will still be the element of saving when the deliberate purpose is to judge we do not know. The last word, like the first word, must be "Have mercy," but the imagined appeal of the Christian conscience in that day—

> **Rex tremendae majestatis,**
> **Qui salvandos salvas gratis,**
> **Salva me, fons pietatis—**

does not affirm any weakness in the Judge, or any light treatment of moral standards.

Some think that we have abandoned the idea of Judgment altogether. A distinguished ex-Anglican has lately said that "Lambeth or Convocation will publish a prayer saying something like, 'Guide us, O Lord, in the solution of our social problems'; and the great organ of old will groan in the background, '. . . All who are desolate or oppressed.' The first Anglicans asked for peace and happiness, truth and justice; but nothing can stop the latest Anglicans, and many others, from asking for improvement in international relations. Let anyone recall for himself the very finest passages in the Book of Common Prayer, and he will soon see that they are concerned specially with spiritual thoughts and themes that now seem strange and terrible; but anyhow, the reverse of common; '. . . in the hour of death and in the day of Judgment.' Who talks about the hour of death? Who talks about the Day of Judgment? Only a litter of shabby little priests from the Italian Mission. Not certainly the popular and eloquent Dean of Bumblebury, who is so Broad and yet so High. Certainly not the charming and fashionable Vicar of St. Ethelbald's, who is so High and yet so Broad. Still less the clergyman helping in the same parish, who is frankly Low. Did you ever hear the curate fresh from the cricket-field, or the vicar smiling under the Union Jacks of the Conservative Rally, dwell upon that penultimate peril; or the danger of falling from God amid the pains of death? Very morbid. Just like those Dago devotional books. So very *Roman*." It is ingenious leg-pulling. But somehow we are not amused. Is it fatal so to express it? Is it the old Victorian complacency? It may be, but there are two other possibilities. It may be that our legs are really not now ticklish under this particular form of attack. Or it may be that our critic has found an old pair of trousers

on a scrap-heap, and is pulling them. After all, it is 1935. And most of our critics charge us with having too much dogma rather than too little. At any rate, a common item of our spiritual panoply as well as of our liturgical terminology is "In the hour of death, and in the Day of Judgment, Good Lord deliver us."

The just published two Lives of Bishop Gore and Archbishop Davidson are in the present number reviewed side by side. But, though Bishop Gore has been read and well considered, the two portly volumes of Dr. Bell's work reached us at a date when it was difficult to do full justice to them. Suffice it to say that, while Mr. Prestige with remarkable skill has given us a faithful and exact picture of the Bishop, Dr. Bell's is a *magnum opus*. He has had singular advantages in writing it, but he seems to have used them with something like genius. Wise reviewers look before they leap, but, on the other hand, adventures are to the adventurous, and the verdict, arrived at admittedly *per saltum*, is that the book is monumental.

There are two smaller books for which we desire to ask a hearing. Mr. Alan Richardson in his *The Redemption of Modernism* (Skeffington, 2s. 6d.) has some new and true things to say. In case anyone should suppose that it is only an attempt to arrive at a minimum creed, it must be said that the title bears an exact meaning. The book begins with a careful and thoroughly well-informed analysis of the breakdown of the old Liberalism. It has friendly things to say of neo-Catholicism and neo-Evangelicalism, but it pins its faith to a neo-Modernism. This neo-Modernism, however, is a thing that can hardly be said yet to exist. It is a ministry of all the talents, dedicated to the true glory of God and the intelligent service of an understood modern world. It denies no received doctrine, but it is prepared to abandon a great many of the old activities, not all of which will be easily let go. The root cause of the Church's weakness is said to be that we acquiesce in and even encourage an acquisitive society. "Theology cannot be considered in the abstract, apart from the whole political-social ethical complex which underlies the situation of a given age." "The Church must be divested of all class-prejudices, of all vestiges of self-satisfied humanism, of defeatist pietism, of backward-looking mediævalism, of all moral complacency and sentimental optimism." Mr. Richardson provides material for self-examination, and also constructive suggestion, for those who are sometimes disposed to say after, or instead of, going to church,

"What has all this got to do with life?" The Master of the Temple in a Preface notes with approval the new tendency of "Modernism" to extract meaning from the old ideas and the old words.

The other book is one of Mr. C. F. Andrews' heart-searching essays, *India and Britain : a Moral Challenge* (Student Christian Movement Press, 5s.). Mr. Andrews begins by saying that no one must carry away the thought that the Constitution now offered to India will suffice, and that our debts are paid. His discussion of the problem is thrown into the form of dialogue—it is, we imagine, for the most part the report of conversations actually held—between representatives of "the two countries which I love most on earth—Great Britain and India." The general theme is that "Europe can no longer bestride the rest of the world 'like a Colossus.' It is noticed by every thoughtful Indian that this evil has its centre in the Anglo-Saxon world, and has become entrenched within the Christian Church. If Great Britain comes to stand for a White Empire, wherein Indians are to be treated as racial inferiors, they will have none of it." It is always easy to excuse oneself, and there is the haunting fear that even what is put forward as the application of principle is not altogether unconnected with national self-interest, but on the other hand there does seem reason to believe that quite recent events have renewed in very many of us a wholesome and humble distaste for policies of self-aggrandizement. Nevertheless, there is very much of which we all need to repent, and even if it be true that Mr. Andrews has moved so far from the land of his birth towards the land of his adoption that he has rather ceased to be an effective bridge, yet what he says is deeply to be considered. What we want in India, and indeed in Europe, is to get under the skin of the other peoples and know what they feel. Here we have a man who does that, and although those in authority may well be aware of difficulties which he does not mention, they ought to listen to his evidence.

One more book—quite different from either of the above, but a sheer delight to read—is Mr. A. P. Herbert's *What a Word!* We have from time to time wondered if Mr. Herbert's zeal for liberty was not a thought too limited. It seemed to concentrate overmuch on the case, doubtless an arguable case, for more public-houses, and longer hours for the sale of intoxicants. Here he rides out as the champion of a great linguistic tradition, which is indeed in grave danger. Not only Hollywood

but Lombard Street and Whitehall have become public enemies; Mr. Herbert's aim, as he might himself derisively put it, is to categorically and with no uncertain voice re-de-neologize the English language. He addresses himself mainly to business men, who decry the learning of Latin in schools and themselves shed innocent ink and employ unnecessary typists in assuring their correspondents that they are in receipt of an esteemed communication in connection with the above matter, and they are prepared to undertake to proceed to counter-proposition their correspondents *re* same. It may be hoped that they will wince, but we confess that we ourselves, in these matters "a Pharisee, a son of Pharisees," are wounded in a place or two. It would have been in some ways a good book for Lent reading, as providing a motive for repentance, but it is so amusing that perhaps after all Advent is a rather less unsuitable time. Mr. Herbert does not attempt to do over again the good work of Mr. H. W. Fowler, nor does he touch spelling. If he did, he would no doubt be found on the right side in the great crusade to promote the right spelling of the verb "to shew," where THEOLOGY is fighting a hard battle. The Cambridge University Press has hitherto been a valued ally, but of late has once or twice "shown" signs of weakening. Another important orthographical campaign is being waged on the Virger-front. And Quires are coming in again. It is less easy to feel sure about Quirister. Wykehamists would tell us that it means something different. Besides, it looks odd. But then, so do lots of things.

One of our good reviewers, giving an account of *The Church's Real Work*, by Canon R. C. Joynt, said that the author was Canon Missioner of the Diocese of Southwark. It is an office that he has never held, though he was from 1919 to 1931 the much-respected Archdeacon of Kingston-on-Thames, and is still Canon and Chancellor of the Cathedral. In the note on Dr. Temple's Gifford Lectures in November on p. 285, line 8 from foot, "no man's" should read "a man's"; an unfortunate error, inasmuch as the author's sentence ran, "a man's act is to be judged by its consequences."

Miss Vibert of S.P.G. writes that the waiting list of missionaries overseas who would be thankful for copies of THEOLOGY but cannot afford the subscription, though it was reduced lately by the kindness of several of our subscribers, has grown again to eighteen. Will those who may be willing to help in this way be so good as to write to Miss Vibert, S.P.G., 15, Tufton Street, Westminster, S.W. 1.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY TRINITY*

As all of my brethren, of course, will have had to do, I have again and again had the duty of preaching on Trinity Sunday, and have, as I suppose we all have, taken the occasion to endeavour to convey as clearly as I could to the minds of the congregation the doctrine of the Holy and Undivided Trinity. As I have grown older and as my mind has developed, I have found myself drawn to a way of expressing the doctrine which is different from the language I used as a young man, and I am anxious to learn whether my apprehension of the doctrine will satisfy other minds which it is not for me to instruct but to consult in the hope of profiting by an interchange of language and of thought.

I was brought up to accept the teaching of the Apostles' and the Nicene Creeds and of the Athanasian Hymn. I was also brought up to believe that all the statements made in those three creeds were either drawn directly and explicitly from Holy Scripture or could be asserted to be implicit in scriptural statements. Accordingly I remember that many years ago, when with the assistance of an old pupil I was engaged in reading the Epistle of Barnabas and in tabulating the uses of all the Greek words in it as my contribution to the lexicon of Ecclesiastical Greek that Dr. Darwell Stone has in preparation, I thought it right and even necessary to distinguish amongst the instances of the use of ὁ Κύριος and of Θεός those in which the words as I thought would mean Jehovah as known to the Hebrews before the Incarnation and those in which as I supposed, the writer, being a Christian, would mean the Holy Trinity. I have now come to see that Dr. Inge is right when he insists that the Christian Church did not instantly understand the full implications of their belief in Our Lord. Not only were the Apostles led by gradual steps to the belief that Jesus was the Christ, that He was the ideal and representative Son of Man, that He was the Son of God, but the Church only attained by slow development through meditation and discussion to the doctrine of the Trinity in the unity of the Godhead. Yet this does not mean, as some thinkers have suggested, that the doctrine as articulated by later centuries is untrue or that it is something superimposed on the simpler and more acceptable teaching given by Our Lord Himself or by His first Apostles. Assuming that the fully developed doctrine is true, as I believe it is, we can understand how the Jew who had been taught by centuries of painful discipline that there was but one God could not in an instant

* A paper read before *The Concord* at Manchester on May 20, 1935.

accommodate this monotheistic belief to his new belief in Jesus Christ. The old modes of thought, the old forms of expression, would still persist, we may be sure, even when he had been led emotionally and intellectually to accept the Jesus, to whose life and death and resurrection he was a witness, as his Lord and Master, to whom, like St. Stephen, he lifted up his heart in prayer. In the same way I remember a young curate whom I knew many years ago telling me that having been brought up in the atmosphere and traditions of Methodism he found himself constantly employing the conventional language of Methodism when he was preaching. Accordingly, as I read the New Testament I feel no surprise now when I notice that one writer and another uses the name "God" not for the Sacred Trinity but for the First Person of the Trinity. The Grace, as we call it, with which we habitually conclude our services illustrates my point exactly. "The Grace," says St. Paul, "of Our Lord Jesus Christ and the Love of God and the Fellowship of the Holy Ghost." Dean Inge has gone so far as to assert that there is no clear instance—at any rate, that he can find no instance which is clear to his mind—in which St. Paul unambiguously ascribes Deity to Our Lord. This is a matter of exact Greek scholarship and of logical interpretation. It would not affect my position if he were right; in point of fact, I believe that there are two passages where sound scholarship requires us to claim that St. Paul reached that height of theological understanding which recognizes within the unity of the Godhead the First and the Second Persons of the Trinity.

In Philippians ii. 6, as I was taught at Shrewsbury, we should, I think, find in *ὑπάρχων* the sense "being at the outset." In that case I urge that the language seems to suggest that what Our Lord emptied Himself of was not the rank of the pre-existent representative or ideal Man, but of Godhead. The Dean's understanding of *ἁρπαγμόν* does not nullify this view, nor establish beyond contradiction that Our Lord only attained Deity after humiliation and exultation. Rather I interpret the words to mean "being from eternity within the Godhead, He did not view equality with the Father (*i.e.*, Deity) as something which anyone else might pick up if He laid it aside, and accordingly He divested himself of its timelessness and illimitability."

In Galatians iii. 20, where we are told that 150 different interpretations have been attempted, I cannot but think that the course of the argument requires that Our Lord and the Father should be asserted by St. Paul to be one God, so that between God the Father and the Incarnate Son there being no mediator, the new covenant is superior to that which was given through Moses.

Whether I be right or wrong in my exegesis of these two passages, the Dean's general view may, I am sure, be accepted, and we shall be content to recognize that the writers in the New Testament had not attained to the articulated doctrine of the Sacred Trinity which later Doctors of the Church have developed, and moreover that these New Testament writers continually employed language reflecting their pre-Christian monotheism and hardly reconcilable with even that measure of Christian truth into which they had entered. An illustration of what I mean is supplied by the narrative in the Fourth Gospel of Our Lord's interview with St. Thomas. The Apostle, hard-headed, yet capable of heartfelt devotion, his *a priori* reasoning swept aside by the evidence of his senses, in an ecstasy of enthusiasm exclaims "My Lord and my God!" Immediately afterwards, however, the Evangelist gives as words coming from Our Lord's own lips, "I ascend to My Father and your Father and to My God and your God." This, of course, is entirely congruous with the developed orthodox doctrine: our Lord's humanity worships the Father as God. Such language is unique (I believe) on Our Lord's lips; yet it shews how we must not expect at all times from the first disciples a carefully orthodox expression of the faith that was in them.

At this point I may say one word on an expression found a few times in New Testament writers—"the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ"—if this be the right translation. The Greek permits the words to be taken to mean "the true God who is also the Father of Our Lord," but it cannot be denied that the other translation may be the truer. If so it is noticeable that the writer speaks of "the God of Jesus Christ," which we may presume is to be understood in a way like that in which we understand "the God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob." Should this be right we shall have another example of how the early Jewish believers continued to use language habitual with them before they became Christians.

There is no space here to expatiate further on the language of the New Testament. I must be content with the reminder that in the Apocalypse there is much which, coming from a Jewish writer, can hardly be taken to mean anything less than that his pre-Christian monotheism has been profoundly modified by his Christian faith.

It may be noted at this point that our historical evidence suggests the possibility that it was among Christians with whom the Septuagint was in habitual use rather than the Hebrew Old Testament that the recognition of Our Lord Jesus Christ as God was most quickly brought about. The use of "the Lord" as a reverent substitute for the sacred name Jahveh

facilitated an identification of the Jesus whom they worshipped as Master or Lord with the God who had spoken to the Fathers. Many confused and confusing theories seem to have been propounded in consequence. Thinkers steeped in Greek philosophy and Gnostic metaphysics attempted in various ways to reconcile their beliefs in a single Transcendent Omnipresent God, and the God who had revealed himself as Jahveh, and the God who had manifested himself as Man in the Incarnate life. Nevertheless it would appear to be certain that the later orthodox definitions did not spring from erroneous confusion as to the significance of 'Lord,' but from meditation upon the facts of the incarnate life and Our Lord's teaching in conjunction with the facts of the Hebrew history and the teaching of the prophets.

I shall not attempt to re-tell the story of the gradual development by which subsequently the Christian Church secured definiteness in its theistic teaching by pronouncing various presentations of the truth to be inconsistent with Christian tradition. I shall, however, ask you to consider the three creeds from what may perhaps be a new point of view with some of you. It is a commonplace that the Nicene or rather the Constantinopolitan creed is an amplification of the Apostles' Creed, additions being made at various points to exclude, as I have said, novel theories propounded by teachers who were labouring to make the faith intelligible to the men of their day. The point on which I wish to insist now is that both of these creeds use language natural enough for the first Christians who had been steeped in Jewish monotheism before they became Christians, but language which is not in the last resort logically natural for one who holds the fully developed orthodox Christian faith. Each clause in the Apostles' Creed springs obviously from the Jewish monotheistic faith modified by the acceptance of the claims of Our Lord. The Apostles' Creed makes the Father alone to be God. It is the Jew's confession of faith. To it is added the Christian's acceptance of Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah, the only Son of God, and of course it further adds the assertion of belief in the Holy Spirit. Even the Nicene creed does not explicitly state that the Third Person of the Trinity is God. I have been driven to the notion that a great deal of the confusion in the minds of our people is due to our continuing to use these creeds, which in the age when they were formulated expressed the Christian faith, but which honestly and fairly regarded from a detached and independent point of view do not express the orthodox faith as it has found expression later in the Athanasian Hymn. I have even dared to imagine that, if the Christian faith were fully expressed and taught with clear declarations that it is not the language of the New

Testament writers but is the truth into which we have been led under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, many Unitarians might find that the doctrine of the Trinity satisfied both their reason and their emotions. In passing let me say that I am sometimes tempted to desire that we should recognize and accept as members of the Christian Church men who can use the simple language of the first disciples, while we should emphatically continue to teach the full doctrine of the Trinity. The truth, I am sure, would prevail, and I cannot but feel that, had the Catholic Church been slower to exclude those who could not at once leap forward from the simple monotheism of the Jew and yet accepted Jesus as Lord and Christ, the evangelization of the world might have been hastened and the Moslem faith might never have found the means to spread. I will add one further illustration which will I hope make the distinction I am trying to draw still more unambiguous. The Benediction which we are directed to use at the end of our Liturgy falls into two parts. The first is the language of the Jewish Christian, defective from the standpoint of the developed orthodox doctrine: "The peace of God . . . keep your hearts and minds in the knowledge and love of God and of his Son Jesus Christ Our Lord." The second is the language of the articulated creed: "The blessing of God Almighty, the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost."

You will have observed that in what I have said I have frankly abandoned what has sometimes been upheld as one of the postulates of Anglicanism and has certainly been in the past one of the postulates of Protestantism. I do not think, however, that we need be particularly careful in this matter. It is, I believe, quite possible to draw a clear distinction between the doctrinal development which I am suggesting has occurred in regard to our theistic conceptions and the kind of development which Newman finally accepted in regard to the theory of the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin and the theory of the infallibility of the Pope of Rome. Without therefore following up this line of thought I wish to lay before you the way in which I have latterly attempted to convey to simple minds some idea of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. On the one hand we have to say that there are not three separate and distinct Gods in the way that a Greek might have said that Zeus and Apollo and Pluto were gods. There is only one Godhead. On the other hand, within this Godhead there are three Persons. These three Persons are not, as it were, three *prosopa* in a Greek drama—*i.e.*, they are not three apparently distinct figures which in reality are one actor wearing three different masks. They may be said to be, to use the language of the playwright

for whom each character is played by a separate actor, three dramatis personæ. They are Three Persons in the later sense of person. Yet these Three Persons are one Godhead, and I have suggested, as the best human illustration that I can call to mind, a Government with three ministers in it. There is but one Government: their policy is one: yet the three ministers have each their separate and proper function. The Athanasian Hymn itself being expressed in Latin is unable to ensure that the orthodox doctrine is conveyed by it. To use Greek we may say that ὁ Θεός is one, yet all Three Persons in this one God are Θεός. So there are three Θεοί, but it is not true to say that οἱ Θεοί are three in number. In English a typographical device can make the same orthodox meaning clear. There is one GOD: there are not three GODS: yet the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God. There are therefore three Gods although there are not three GODS.

I find some scriptural warrant for conceiving of the Godhead in the way that I do, in some words in the Fourth Gospel. Our Lord in His High Priestly prayer asks that the Christian believers may be One as He and the Father are one. Years ago Illingworth pointed out how the conceptions of human and divine personality had reacted upon one another. Similarly, I conceive that while these words give us some instruction as to the kind of unity that there should be in the Christian Church, they also supply us with some guide to our thought of the Blessed Trinity. The members of the Church have their separate and distinct personalities and their individual functions, yet all should be animated by one spirit. So I believe we are to conceive of the Trinity as three distinct Persons so united in their Wills and Purposes (if I may so express myself) as to be Eternally One. There is therefore in the Christian conception of the Godhead no room for the disagreements imagined by the Greeks in their polytheistic heaven, and yet at the same time there is no obstacle to our realizing that the Three Persons of the Trinity are not three mere aspects of One Being of whom humanity has caught dissimilar glimpses.

Every teacher who has attempted to deal with the subject has naturally found some human or earthly illustration by which he has endeavoured to illuminate the doctrine. Some have found a suggestive parallel, if we may dare to call it so, in the human family, the father, the mother and the child. Yet this illustration has obvious dangers, and before now it has been so simply and so dully followed out that the Holy Spirit has been equated with the mother. It would, it may be suggested, be safer to find our illustration, if it is to be drawn from a family, in three brothers, one of whom is the eldest and has a prece-

dency. St. Augustine gave an illustration less liable to misunderstanding when he suggested that the mind, the body and the spirit in the individual man could give some idea of how the Three Persons of the Trinity were yet one God. Nevertheless this illustration presents difficulties, since in spite of all explanations the natural parallel to the body of a man must be the material Universe in relation to the animating Spirit of God. We are thus led to find Mr. Stewart A. McDowall's suggestion an improvement on St. Augustine's. He would find a parallel in the will, the thought and the emotion which together may be taken to constitute the mental make-up or the spiritual nature of man. All these illustrations have been found to be of service, but it must be insisted that they are one and all no more than illustrations and that they do not give us so true a conception of the Blessed Trinity that we can argue from them with any safety. It has sometimes been suggested that we may think of the Trinity as reflected in the three words used in Bishop Heber's hymn, and find in the Godhead Power, Love and Purity. That we are to recognize these qualities as inherent in God is undeniable. Nevertheless it would be quite misleading to speak as if in the First Person of the Trinity we were to see Power in isolation, in the Second Person Love in isolation, and in the Third Person Purity in isolation. The nature of God is undivided. Each person possesses the same moral qualities. In different ages men have learnt something of God—at one time recognizing His Power, at another His Holiness, at another His Love, yet these progressive revelations to mankind have not been revelations of different Persons in the Godhead. God has from all eternity been the same: it is merely that the limited capabilities of men have through successive instalments received knowledge of the one unchanging God.

You will observe that in this adumbration of a theory of the Trinity there is no ground for labouring to attach significance to the old theological phrases of the Eternal Sonship and the Eternal Procession of the Holy Ghost. The Second Person of the Trinity, having become Incarnate, stood as man in the relation of Son to God as Father. While he was spoken of as the Son of God or God the Son it was necessary and right to affirm that he was "begotten before all worlds" and was "begotten not made." These statements denied false theories which had been suggested and which the Christian Church pronounced to be incompatible with Christian tradition. I believe that when we try to express in a positive form what the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity is, we are well advised to abstain from any attempt to affirm what the relation between

for whom each character is played by a separate actor, three dramatis personæ. They are Three Persons in the later sense of person. Yet these Three Persons are one Godhead, and I have suggested, as the best human illustration that I can call to mind, a Government with three ministers in it. There is but one Government: their policy is one: yet the three ministers have each their separate and proper function. The Athanasian Hymn itself being expressed in Latin is unable to ensure that the orthodox doctrine is conveyed by it. To use Greek we may say that ὁ Θεός is one, yet all Three Persons in this one God are Θεός. So there are three Θεοί, but it is not true to say that οἱ Θεοί are three in number. In English a typographical device can make the same orthodox meaning clear. There is one GOD: there are not three GODS: yet the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God. There are therefore three Gods although there are not three GODS.

I find some scriptural warrant for conceiving of the Godhead in the way that I do, in some words in the Fourth Gospel. Our Lord in His High Priestly prayer asks that the Christian believers may be One as He and the Father are one. Years ago Illingworth pointed out how the conceptions of human and divine personality had reacted upon one another. Similarly, I conceive that while these words give us some instruction as to the kind of unity that there should be in the Christian Church, they also supply us with some guide to our thought of the Blessed Trinity. The members of the Church have their separate and distinct personalities and their individual functions, yet all should be animated by one spirit. So I believe we are to conceive of the Trinity as three distinct Persons so united in their Wills and Purposes (if I may so express myself) as to be Eternally One. There is therefore in the Christian conception of the Godhead no room for the disagreements imagined by the Greeks in their polytheistic heaven, and yet at the same time there is no obstacle to our realizing that the Three Persons of the Trinity are not three mere aspects of One Being of whom humanity has caught dissimilar glimpses.

Every teacher who has attempted to deal with the subject has naturally found some human or earthly illustration by which he has endeavoured to illuminate the doctrine. Some have found a suggestive parallel, if we may dare to call it so, in the human family, the father, the mother and the child. Yet this illustration has obvious dangers, and before now it has been so simply and so dully followed out that the Holy Spirit has been equated with the mother. It would, it may be suggested, be safer to find our illustration, if it is to be drawn from a family, in three brothers, one of whom is the eldest and has a prece-

dency. St. Augustine gave an illustration less liable to misunderstanding when he suggested that the mind, the body and the spirit in the individual man could give some idea of how the Three Persons of the Trinity were yet one God. Nevertheless this illustration presents difficulties, since in spite of all explanations the natural parallel to the body of a man must be the material Universe in relation to the animating Spirit of God. We are thus led to find Mr. Stewart A. McDowall's suggestion an improvement on St. Augustine's. He would find a parallel in the will, the thought and the emotion which together may be taken to constitute the mental make-up or the spiritual nature of man. All these illustrations have been found to be of service, but it must be insisted that they are one and all no more than illustrations and that they do not give us so true a conception of the Blessed Trinity that we can argue from them with any safety. It has sometimes been suggested that we may think of the Trinity as reflected in the three words used in Bishop Heber's hymn, and find in the Godhead Power, Love and Purity. That we are to recognize these qualities as inherent in God is undeniable. Nevertheless it would be quite misleading to speak as if in the First Person of the Trinity we were to see Power in isolation, in the Second Person Love in isolation, and in the Third Person Purity in isolation. The nature of God is undivided. Each person possesses the same moral qualities. In different ages men have learnt something of God—at one time recognizing His Power, at another His Holiness, at another His Love, yet these progressive revelations to mankind have not been revelations of different Persons in the Godhead. God has from all eternity been the same: it is merely that the limited capabilities of men have through successive instalments received knowledge of the one unchanging God.

You will observe that in this adumbration of a theory of the Trinity there is no ground for labouring to attach significance to the old theological phrases of the Eternal Sonship and the Eternal Procession of the Holy Ghost. The Second Person of the Trinity, having become Incarnate, stood as man in the relation of Son to God as Father. While he was spoken of as the Son of God or God the Son it was necessary and right to affirm that he was "begotten before all worlds" and was "begotten not made." These statements denied false theories which had been suggested and which the Christian Church pronounced to be incompatible with Christian tradition. I believe that when we try to express in a positive form what the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity is, we are well advised to abstain from any attempt to affirm what the relation between

the Three Persons of the Blessed Trinity is in itself. For a considerable time I was satisfied to suppose that the Eastern Church had been right in restricting the Procession of the Holy Spirit to the First Person of the Trinity and to understand the Spanish addition subsequently accepted by the whole Western Church as true only when it was understood to refer solely to the sending forth of the Holy Spirit by our Ascended Lord, while the Procession from the Father was Eternal. Bishop Pearson's textual quotations in support of the statements in the creed would seem to warrant nothing further than this statement of the position as between the East and the West. I have now come, as you will have guessed from what I have already said, to feel rather that we ought not to make any assertion as to any Eternal Procession. We should confine ourselves to that which has occurred within the limits of time and space, and if we do that the Western creed may be claimed to be truer than that of the East. Within the historical process of the world, the Holy Spirit has pleaded with men's consciences both as the advocate of God as known to the Hebrews and as the advocate of Our Lord since His Incarnation and Ascension.

What eternal distinctions exist between the Three Persons of the Sacred Trinity I humbly confess that in my view humanity is never likely to know, at any rate on this side of the grave. What, however, our study of the Universe and of history and Our Lord's life and teaching seem to suggest it may be well briefly to consider. One Person of the Blessed Trinity would seem to have been actively concerned with bringing into being the created Universe and in maintaining the uniformity of natural laws. Whether this is because in some way the Second Person of the Trinity in His eternal nature has some peculiar qualification for this activity how can man presume to guess? Again, One Person in the Blessed Trinity would seem to be immanent in living organisms and in the spirit of man. And, again, whether the Third Person in the Blessed Trinity has some peculiar qualification for this divine emergy what man will dare to guess? Since all Three Persons are eternally of one spiritual purpose, it would seem that there was some peculiar fitness which led the Second Person to become Incarnate and to satisfy the Divine Will for justice, by sharing the disastrous consequences of the Divine creation of a Universe in which His creatures were given the power of self-determination. I have wondered occasionally whether one might safely say that the First Person of the Sacred Trinity is Transcendent God, that the Second is Immanent God, and the Third Energizing God, but I fear that this is to yield to a temptation to try to round off a subject too great for the human mind in a triad of would-be

epigrammatic words. I do not dare therefore to suggest that these words express even what is consonant with orthodox truth. Instead, let me submit to you, after a few further comments, my idea of what a creed should be if we are to have one which shall not continue the defective language of Jewish tradition, but shall throughout attempt to express that truth into which we have gradually been led.

It will be remembered that the English catechism summarizes our faith as regards the functions (so to say) of the Three Divine Persons by using the words Creator, Redeemer, Sanctifier. Undoubtedly this is helpful in the rough, but that it is not entirely satisfactory is shewn by a statement recently made to me by an otherwise well instructed communicant who understood the words "by whom all things were made" in the Nicene Creed, to be attached to "the Father" named in the previous phrase. Yet even if we adhere to the strict classical distinction between *διά*, "through the agency of," and *ὑπό*, "by," it is manifest that the creed, following the prologue to the Fourth Gospel, assigns the actual creation of the world to the Second Person of the Trinity. It would seem to be more proper for men to abstain from attempting to differentiate the activities of each Person of the Trinity and rather to think of Creation, Redemption, Sanctification as all alike being activities and operations of the one God, the Three Persons in unity of spirit willing, planning, effecting, the perfect purpose of the Godhead.

It is to be observed that in the Fourth Gospel words occur which may suggest some precedence within the Godhead. "My Father," Our Lord is represented as saying, "is greater than I." Theologians of the East have interpreted these words as indicating such a precedence; theologians in the West have understood them to mean that the Incarnate Son, because of His human limitations, was inferior to the Father. Another line of support to the Eastern position may be found in a consideration of Our Lord's prayers. It may naturally be argued that He is addressing the First Person of the Blessed Trinity.* Yet this line of argument must be discounted by the reflection that Our Lord in His true humanity must be accounted to have been taught to pray within the forms and categories of Jewish

* The traditional rule of the Church that at the Holy Eucharist our prayers should be addressed to the Father may be claimed to be consonant with what is recorded of Our Lord, but it is likewise explicable as properly resulting from the nature of the Divine Service. In it we may be said to be offering in union with the Head of the Church the Christian sacrifice. He eternally presents His Manhood's sacrifice to God, and this is for men most intelligibly expressed by saying that He presents Himself to the Father. Concurrently the members of Christ's Body in time and place are associated with their Head in presenting His sacrifice and with it also the sacrifice of themselves as parts of His body.

prayer, so that while His communion as Man* with God was intimate, unbroken and complete, as ours is not, it cannot be positively asserted as indubitably certain that His words teach us that He was praying to the First Person of the Trinity exclusively. This consideration warrants hesitation in supposing that the traditional rule is securely founded. It would seem more appropriate for us in face of a mystery transcending human understanding not to define which of the Three Divine Persons should be addressed, but rather to pray to the One God, assured of our access to Him through the Second Person of the Trinity whom we have known as Man.†

The English use of 1662, true to the developed theology of the West, did not hesitate on Trinity Sunday to address, not only in the Collect for the day but in the Proper Preface, the Blessed Trinity rather than the Father alone. It is interesting and perhaps significant that we find in the 1928 Prayer Book that there has been substituted a Proper Preface addressed again to the First Person of the Trinity.

It has sometimes been said that the Eastern theologians had shewn a caution and reticence befitting human ignorance when they adhered to the language of the New Testament, and that the Doctors of the West had been presumptuous in their relentless logic. Yet it may be reasonably retorted that it is the East rather than the West that is here intruding with improper boldness into a mystery too great for man, since it is the East which will have it that the words of Scripture are to be understood of the essential functions of the Three Divine Persons, while the West more humbly limits their application to the facts involved in the Incarnation. It may be noticed also that this case is not altogether dissimilar from that of the two theories with regard to the consecration of the Sacred Species. The East defines that the Third Person of the Trinity effects the consecration. The Western theologians (except those who content themselves with statements which would seem to give a magical power to the mere repetition and recitation of the words of Institution) will go no further than affirm that by the time the people have responded *Amen* to the prayer of Consecration, consecration has been granted in answer to the prayer. As regards the matter here under discussion it should be mentioned that St. Chrysostom and Photius at least agree with the

* As God, we must say that so far as human thought may penetrate into a theme that is super-human, He remained in eternal communion with the First and with the Third Persons of the Sacred Trinity.

† Prayers to the Lord Jesus are in accord with St. Stephen's dying words, but a litany to the Holy Spirit would appear to be difficult of reconciliation with the traditional rule, except on the strength of some such argument as has been urged above.

Westerns in understanding the Gospel statements not to express inherent and essential differences within the Godhead, and although Bishop Westcott contends for the other view, he nevertheless speaks of the possibility that it is reasonable to "ground the congruity of the mission" of the Son upon the immanent pre-eminence of the Father. This, it may be urged, is as far as human speculation should go, and therefore the language derived from the Jewish elements in Christian theology should be minimized, if not eliminated, so that we are not hampered nor trammelled by such an expression as "the Son of the Father." We shall address the Triune God as our Father, and we shall frame our theology in harmony with such language until the conversion of the Jewish people brings into the stream of Christian tradition that contribution without which we shall never have the fullness and richness of Christian knowledge.

The Creeds of the past were embryonic professions of belief with repudiations added of false theories. It may well be that if Creeds are to be used for general recitation they should remain in this form. Nevertheless a Creed which in some sort may serve as a basis for purposes of instruction would seem to have its proper place, and may serve a useful end. Preachers and teachers labouring to put difficult doctrine in a simple form suited to simple people have again and again caught at some illustration or argument which on further examination has been found to be in contradiction with the traditions of the Church and sound theology. It may be that what seems to the present writer a simple presentation of the truth will also prove on examination to be unwarranted. Yet the risk of error must not and should not deter men from adventuring their attempts to convey their apprehension of truth, and accordingly here is a creed that I would suggest as a basis for teaching purposes:

I put my hope and trust in God, Author and Over-ruler of all things, both animate and inanimate, as well visible as invisible; whose being is spirit and who seeks to be worshipped in spirit and in truth; whose property is to be loving, and from whom we have received commandment that we love one another; whose nature is holy, and whose will it is that men should be holy: one only and eternal God; from everlasting to everlasting one Fellowship and Triarchy of three Divine Persons, to wit:

First, the Primus or President to whom our Lord Jesus Christ prayed in the days of His flesh, calling Him Father, and hath Himself bidden us likewise to call upon Him as our heavenly Father.

Secondly, the Demiurge or Agent through whom all creation came into being; who, to retrieve the losses entailed by the

creature's abuse of the power of self-determination and to satisfy the Godhead's will for justice by sharing the pain and death inherent in the plan of creation chosen by the Godhead, in the fullness of the time became Incarnate and was uniquely born of a Virgin Mother and was called Jesus: He truly fulfilled the prophetic utterances which told of a King who should rule the Israel of God; and, for the deliverance of us men and of all creation from sin and pain and death, was crucified, slain and buried, and the third day rose again, His mortal body transmuted into a glorious body; and afterwards He returned into the invisible world where He was before, incorporating humanity in the Deity; and He shall be the ultimate Judge of all created beings.

Thirdly, the Advocate of the cause of Right and Holiness, implanting eternal life in the souls of men and prompting the prophets to utter in various manners and in various measure the divine revelation to mankind: He dwells especially in the disciples of Christ, that they may walk worthy of their calling to be holy, who, once and for all, are admitted into this world-wide Fellowship, not by right of lineage but by Baptism and the sincere acceptance of the need of repentance and of the Divine Advocate's assistance in order to the cleansing from sin and the overcoming of their faults; who under divine guidance are minded to continue stedfastly in the Fellowship and teaching of the Apostles' successors and have assurance that their Lord will raise them up also to an eternal life of glory.

T. NICKLIN.

ON THE ORIGIN OF THE GOSPELS

IT is well in studying the origin of the Gospels to begin by reminding ourselves of certain fundamental facts with regard to the documents that we are to consider.

I ask you to begin with what is, I believe, a demonstrable element in the life of Him of whom they treat. As Dr. Carnegie Simpson points out in *The Fact of Christ*, Jesus, unlike all other religious and philosophical leaders, deliberately and without reserve made Himself the centre and sum of all His teaching. Discipleship, as He taught it, was a direct personal relationship. The success of His mission on earth was to be measured by the extent to which He could reveal Himself to men according to the inmost truth of His being, and win their love, their faith, and their obedience.

I do not think that anyone will challenge the accuracy of this description of the ministry as recorded in each of the four

Gospels, with differences of emphasis, but remarkable harmony in general impression. In view of the uniqueness of the phenomenon, this is no doubt, as Dr. Carnegie Simpson claims, a strong guarantee of the faithfulness of the narrators to historical fact: all the more, because they do nothing to call attention to this feature in the life they are relating, and may well have been unaware of it.

Notice next, what also is surely an undeniable fact. The personality of Jesus is today, as Archbishop Temple has recently reminded us, a vital and growingly important power in the life of the world. Mankind at large, and not only believers in Christ, have a clear grasp of the fundamental characteristics of His character and teaching. The Hindu is capable of convicting Christian believers of their failure in various ways to embody His likeness.

The fact that they can do this, and that we can check for ourselves the extent of our failure is due to the fact that "the Gospel" has been embodied for us in the four small volumes, which are practically our sole source of information with regard to the life that He lived in Palestine 1,900 years ago.

This does not mean that we must regard the Gospels as immune from criticism, or be anything but grateful for the immense labour that has been bestowed on the question of how they came to be what they are, in the course of the last century. But it should make us review very carefully any argument which would require us to believe that they were fundamentally mistaken, and that the Jesus whom they describe was not the true historical Jesus.

We must pass on from this general statement of the claim of the Gospels at least on respectful attention, to consider what we can discover with regard to the forces that brought them into existence.

It is surely a noteworthy fact that Jesus, when so much depended on the truth of the impression that He left behind Him, should not have done what the prophets of old time had done, and committed at least some part of His teaching to writing.

We cannot doubt that He deliberately chose to concentrate on the training of a small band of disciples, and to trust entirely to their memory of the things that they had seen and heard, for the influence that the story of His life and teaching was to have in the world to the end of time.

The wonder of that confidence grows on us the more we dwell upon it. The disciples on whose witness He relied were what the professional theologians of the day called "unlearned and ignorant." They had no professional training either in

letters or religion. They were deeply conscious, as they looked back, of their moral imperfections and their lack of spiritual apprehension. The inner meaning of what He did and of what He taught had inevitably been hidden from them at the time. It could not but be, as a Victorian critic noted, that Jesus had been all the time "ahead of His reporters." And yet here the Gospels are producing from the memories of these imperfect witnesses (surely not without the help of the promised Comforter [St. John iv. 26]) the result that we behold.

How, then, we cannot but ask, did this come about? The latest development of Gospel criticism essays, by the application of the method that scholars are content to describe under its German title as *Formgeschichte*, to get behind St. Mark, and to get back to the material out of which he composed his Gospel. They claim to be able to identify a certain number of sections, some of them relating a characteristic incident, some of them a distinctive utterance of the Lord, which may have formed the text of a discourse which had as its object the conversion of the Gentiles. This is not in itself a probable suggestion. Detached incidents in our Lord's life and specimens of His teaching can hardly have had much appeal to the unconverted. It is well no doubt to be reminded that such traditions under certain circumstances might have an apologetic or controversial value, and that a preacher might be tempted to modify them in detail to sharpen their point to suit his purpose. But that does not throw any light on the source of the original store of reminiscences. And, so far as the preacher yielded to the temptation, he would falsify the deposit he had inherited.

The attraction of the method to its inventor would seem to be that it affords an opportunity of eliminating from the Gospels elements that are too aggressively supernatural; and so to reduce the shock to the critical consciousness that even St. Mark, the earliest of our Gospels, cannot, as it stands, fit such a picture of Jesus as it is prepared to recognize as "historical." In the end, however, I cannot but believe that we shall have to acquiesce in the fact that all our traditional story of the life of Jesus comes to us from those who believed Him to be the Christ, the Son of God, who had died and risen again from the dead. Neither they nor their disciples would have cared to revive the memories of His life had they not believed that.

We shall recognize that where we can test the operation of the bias of early reporters by the minutest comparison of the divergences between the first three Evangelists, the utmost that can be said is that the later writers shew a tendency to avoid using language that might suggest any limitation in the

power of Jesus to heal or in the success of His ministrations. They also now and then seem to seek to save the credit of the Apostles by passing over some instances of their failure. But it is clearly impossible on the strength of this evidence to credit their predecessors with the complete transformation of the original picture which the critical position demands. It is indeed possible to hope that the day may come when the features in the narratives, to which Carnegie Simpson points as evidence of their fundamental veracity, will be allowed their due weight. The appearance of such a book as *The Original Jesus*, by Otto Borchert, should remind us that there is in Truth a self-evidencing quality which must in the end carry conviction.

I do not, therefore, as I have shewn, anticipate much permanent assistance from the *Formgeschichte* hypothesis in the understanding either of the origin or of the content of the Evangelic tradition.

The Bishop of Bradford at Bournemouth found in the hypothesis a timely reminder of the fact "that the Gospels were not only written *for* the Church by members of the Church," but also "were in a sense also written *by* the Church, in that the Church corporately sponsored the traditions which the Gospels have compiled."

I cannot myself see how the hypothesis supports this conclusion. Surely the growth of the Gospel Canon, and the abundant evidence that the second century provides of the watchful criticism of which that growth is the outcome is the real justification of our confidence in the resultant supremacy of "the Four."

At the same time it is well to be challenged to think out again the process by which "the Gospels" were in fact written not only "for the Church" but also "by the Church." In our passion to think some new thing, it is easy to overlook valuable suggestions from our predecessors, because we assume that their work is superseded; especially if, in one respect, further study has led us to reject one of their conclusions.

In regard to the matter immediately in front of us, I feel that we are not likely to make much progress as long as we give free reign to our imaginations without any reference to the masterly analysis of the conditions under which "the oral Gospel" took shape in Jerusalem in the first twenty years after Pentecost, given by Dr. Westcott in his *Introduction to the Study of the Gospels*, Chapter III., "On the Oral Gospel." It is true that later study seems to have shewn that the oral hypothesis does not provide an adequate solution of all the facts. But at the same time Dr. Westcott's account of the

conditions under which the Gospel Tradition passed while it was still in its oral stage does throw light on that which we have seen to be the true "Riddle of the Gospels." I mean the way in which results of such surpassing value came through men who to all appearance were hopelessly inadequate for the task committed to them.

The Apostles must have found themselves from the Day of Pentecost onwards confronted with the task of training others in the discipleship of Jesus, into which they had themselves been admitted.

When we put ourselves into their position and realize how far they must have been from any adequate intellectual apprehension of the person and work of their Master, or of the principles which had regulated the development of His ministry, we see how impossible the task committed to them would have been (1) without the assurance of His triumph over death, which came from their intercourse with Him after His resurrection; and (2) without the gift of the Spirit in token of His present power over their hearts and lives; and (3) without hope of His return and the final consummation. His death, so far from marking the close of their discipleship, had only intensified their sense of personal dependence. Their primary duty, therefore, was to call men to enter with them into a present experience.

In the fulfilment of their task they had, we must remember, from the first, as we still have, the help of the two Sacraments of the Gospel: Baptism and the Breaking of Bread, outward and visible signs of the inner and spiritual bonds by which each disciple is bound in a direct and personal relationship to his invisible Lord.

At the same time we have what the converts on the day of Pentecost had not, the help of the written Gospels to give definite content to our thoughts about Him, and to enable us to enter intelligently into His mind and heart and will. We have the inestimable advantage of being able to turn to them (to use the language of St. Ignatius) "as to the flesh of Christ." They help us, as Erasmus said, to form a clearer picture of Him in our minds than we could have acquired by the sight of our eyes. The earliest disciples could not have this help. They had to depend instead on the personal witness of the Apostles. Our Gospels are the outcome of the efforts of the Apostles to deliver this part of their witness faithfully. It will be worth while to try to trace the steps by which this result was brought about.

The teaching of the Apostles rested, of course, from the first on a basis of historic fact. That basis, however, was

strictly limited. It consisted, to start with, simply of the death and the resurrection of Jesus. St. Paul summarizes it concisely in 1 Cor. xv. 3 f.: "For I delivered unto you first of all that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures; and that He was buried, and that He hath been raised on the third day according to the Scriptures."

In the earliest days the memory of Jesus was still fresh in Jerusalem and in Palestine generally, so the Apostles could pass from the notorious fact of the Cross to the evidence of the Resurrection, and to the Scripture proofs that suffering was the divinely appointed gate of entrance into glory for the Messiah.

At the same time, at an early stage in the training of their newly enrolled fellow-disciples, the Apostles must have found themselves drawing on their memories of "the things that they had seen and heard." The meaning of discipleship for them was closely bound up with these memories. And they supplied a natural and ready way to help men who had not known their Master to understand the traditions of the school of which they had become members. It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that the motive which led the Apostles in the first instance to draw on their reminiscences was strictly biographical. The significance of the personality of Jesus in the educational system of the Church would not have been apparent at the outset. Pupils in a Jewish school would expect primarily to be given a Rule of Life; and the commission of the Risen Lord expressly charges the Apostles (St. Matt. xxviii. 20) to teach men to observe all that He had commanded them. Interest would, therefore, have been concentrated at first on "the words of the Lord," especially those which had a direct bearing on character and conduct. If so, reports of our Lord's teaching, such as those that are collected by St. Matthew in "The Sermon on the Mount," "The instructions to the Twelve," "The Parables," and "The Eschatological Discourse," would constitute the oldest stratum in "the oral Gospel," and form the basis of the catechetical instruction, of which St. Luke speaks in the preface to his Gospel.

It is in harmony with this that we find from the Acts that the Church was early known in Jewish circles as "The Way." St. Paul was clearly acquainted—and expected other disciples to be acquainted—with "the words of the Lord Jesus." The first step towards the formation of a New Testament was taken as soon as Christian writers began to quote the words of the Lord as authoritative side by side with Moses and the Prophets. From the first, therefore, the Apostles must have drawn on their memories of the instruction that they had themselves received, when they began to expound the law of the Spirit of

Life in Christ Jesus for the guidance of the infant Church in Jerusalem. Pupils in Jewish schools were trained to trust to their memories. To put anything in writing might encroach on the prerogatives of "the Scripture." So teaching would lack a textbook, and the teachers would quote and apply to the need of the moment any relevant saying of the Lord that occurred to them. And so little by little the experience of life would sift out the sayings that had the most universal and abiding significance.

Special incidents associated with memorable sayings would, in course of time, establish their place in the tradition. These would include examples of "the mighty works, and wonders, and signs which God had done" through Jesus. But no effort would be made to stress the element of wonder. Jesus being what the Resurrection declared Him to be, there was nothing surprising in their occurrence. It was a matter of common knowledge that such signs had been wrought in the course of His ministry, and they had their lesson for disciples. But the faith of the Church did not spring from or rest upon them. There was nothing "evidential" about them, except their agreement with the prophetic portrait of the Servant of the Lord. Still there they were, and little by little "the oral Gospel" grew till it contained material, if not for "a life of Jesus," at least for a vivid picture of His manifold activities, when at last the need for a written record became urgent, with the lapse of time, and the spread of the Church beyond Palestine.

St. Luke in his preface (i. 1-4) comes to our assistance just at this point, and enables us to picture to ourselves the steps by which the oral teaching of the Apostles passed into the shape with which we are familiar in the first three of our Gospels. The chief points, as Dr. Westcott draws them out in his *Introduction to the Study of the Gospels* (pp. 185 f.), are these: "The common basis of the Evangelic narratives is said to be the oral '*tradition of those who from the beginning* (Acts i. 21 f.) *were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word.*' The two elements in the Apostolic character which have been already pointed out, personal knowledge and practical experience, are recognized by St. Luke as present in those who originally *handed* down the history, which many attempted to draw up and arrange afresh in a connected shape. The work of these unknown first evangelists was new only in form, and not in substance. The tradition which they incorporated in a narrative was not peculiar to themselves, but was common to all; for the common belief was independent of these written records. . . . Theophilus was already *instructed in the words* of the exact truth of which St. Luke wished to assure him; and his instruction was derived

from that oral teaching which is described by the same term from the first foundation of the Church (Acts xviii. 25, 1 Cor. xiv. 19, Gal. vi. 6)."

It is on some such presuppositions as these that the Synoptic criticism of the last seventy years has been built. We used to think that one "assured result" of that criticism was that a document substantially identical with our "Mark" was in the hands of "Matthew" and "Luke." The arrangement of incidents in Mark seems presupposed in Matt. xiv.-xxviii. and in the relevant sections in Luke. And, furthermore, Dr. E. A. Abbott gave strong grounds for believing that "at all events in some passages Mark contains the whole of a tradition from which Matthew and Luke borrowed parts. It is, therefore, not easy to see how a comparison of the sections that Matthew and Luke have in common with Mark can throw light on the form in which they came to Mark, except possibly in the rare cases where Matthew and Luke agree in a variation from his text.

We must, therefore, wait for some more solid evidence than has as yet been produced on behalf of the hypothesis of *Formgeschichte*, before we throw away the evidence of Papias that connects the origin of Mark with the preaching of Peter. That evidence comes, if not from the elder John himself, at least from one who belonged, as Papias did not, to the generation that was contemporary with the Apostles, and so cannot be supposed to have invented the connection in order to bolster up the authority of a document which he was in a position to criticize.

J. O. F. Murray.

THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT: A STUDY IN MORAL THEOLOGY

It is by no means an uncommon experience for a conscientious Christian to find himself in doubt as to the lawfulness of a particular action or a certain course of conduct. Further, he recognizes that, in order to act with a good conscience, he must arrive at certainty by some means or another; for to act in doubt is to act with a bad conscience. A specific case, which was brought to my notice only a few weeks ago, will serve as a simple illustration. A dressmaker had been in the habit, for reasons which need not be specified here, of spending a considerable time in sewing every Sunday. A sermon on Sunday observance led her to recognize the obligation of ab-

staining from servile work on that day; but she had a genuine doubt as to whether the obligation was binding in her case. How could the doubt be changed into certainty ?

It will be observed that here the doubt is in respect of the binding power of the law in the particular circumstances; but doubts may also arise as to whether a law actually exists, or whether there is any real authority behind a particular law, or as to what is the actual intention of the law-giver. Probably our first impulse on meeting with such problems would be to attempt to solve each one on its own merits; but such a procedure is temerarious and entirely unscientific, and moral theology emphatically claims to be rational and scientific in its methods. So, in a spirit of scientific enquiry, we have to ask ourselves the question: Can all, or at least the majority, of cases of doubt be included under a general rule, the application of which will resolve the doubt and enable the person concerned to act with certainty ?

There are several systems which claim to give a satisfactory answer to the question, and the aim of this article is to submit them to a critical examination, so that we may judge of their worth. First, there is a system which goes by the name of Tutiorism, and has as its rule the principle *In dubio pars tutior eligenda*. It maintains that in all cases of doubt the law must be obeyed, for this is the safer course to follow. In applying it to the special instance I have quoted, the dressmaker would have to abstain from servile work on Sunday, however strong might be her reasons for doubting if the law applied in her exceptional circumstances of hardship, poverty, or whatever they might be.

It is easy to see that this system involves an absolutely rigorist attitude in morals, which jeopardizes the ends both of justice and mercy. The outstanding defender of Tutiorism was Joan. Sinnigh, an Irish theologian of the seventeenth century; the system was adopted by the Jansenists, and formally condemned by the Church. The Rev. C. J. Shebbeare, writing in the *Church Quarterly Review* of July, 1912, significantly describes the system as " equivalent to saying: When in doubt give way to your scruples, a principle which would often lead to a cowardly desertion of duty." He further emphasizes a fact which is often ignored, that " the tendency of the high-minded amateur in moral theology is always and everywhere towards rigorism, and rigorism is the very worst of all possible systems for the scrupulous."

At the opposite extreme we find the system known as Laxism, which maintains that we may always avail ourselves of the benefit of the doubt even when there is only the slightest

probability that such is the proper course to take. Such a system is clearly contrary to the Gospel ethic, and brings the moral law into contempt. Nevertheless it has been advocated in one form or another by well-meaning but short-sighted moralists. The theologians who professed this system all lived in the seventeenth century; and the names of Bauny, Escobar, and Diana would now be unknown, even to clerics, had not Pascal immortalized them in his famous *Provincial Letters*. We must not forget, however, that the laxists were as wholeheartedly condemned by theologians and popes as they were by Pascal. Diana is described by a contemporary, who strange to say was himself a laxist, and moreover possessed a greater sense of humour than of reverence, as "*Agnus Dei qui tollit peccata mundi.*" Those who are acquainted with the literature will recognize that the force of Pascal's arguments, strengthened by his subtle irony and devastating invective, was derived mainly from the material supplied by the advocates of Laxism. Well might he exclaim: "How useful it is to have many writers on moral theology!" Unfortunately, from the point of view of sound scholarship, the literary value of the *Provincial Letters* has obscured their unreliability on the particular moral questions we are considering.

Between the extremes of Tutiorism and Laxism there are three systems which profess to solve the problem of the benefit of the doubt; they are named respectively, Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, and Probabilism.

The formula of the probabiliorists is, *In dubio stricto seu æquali pars tutior sequenda est.* This means that Probabiliorism allows us to decide in favour of freedom, that is to take the benefit of the doubt *only* when the reasons against the validity, or binding power, of the law are certainly greater than those in its favour. Or, to put it in another way and in the words of a modern Roman Catholic moralist, "as long as the conscience is strictly in doubt, that is to say, while it suspends judgment without inclining either way, the law must be obeyed." The system came into favour with the condemnation of Tutiorism, and was advocated chiefly, but not exclusively, by Dominican scholars. It also appears in the moral theology of the Reformers, and is advocated by Bishop Jeremy Taylor.

However admirable Probabiliorism may be in theory, it breaks down entirely in practice, and almost invariably leads to Tutiorism; for this reason it has no supporters today. In the words of Dr. K. E. Kirk: "It is impossible in most cases for the questioner or his adviser to sum up the arguments so fully and exactly as to enable him to decide on which side the balance of probability lies." He also puts forward the in-

teresting opinion that the fact of the Reformers being "probabiliorists to a man" may account to some extent for the subsequent abandonment of moral theology outside the Roman Church. Although Probabiliorism has no defenders amongst modern moralists, the systems of Equiprobabilism and Probabilism find powerful advocates amongst Roman scholars; but neither system can claim to be the official teaching of the Roman Church.

Since Equiprobabilism is intended to correct certain disadvantages, or errors, it sees in Probabilism, we will consider the latter system first. Probabilism has this great advantage, that it is essentially practical and can easily be applied to specific cases of doubt. The principle which forms the basis of Probabilism may be stated as follows: "If I am in doubt as to the lawfulness of a particular action I may follow a solidly probable opinion in favour of liberty (that is, I may disregard the law), even if the opinion in favour of the law is more probable." Fr. Henry Davis, S.J., claims that this is common sense as well as sound morals. It means, in effect, "If I cannot make up my mind for myself, I will act as some good people act, though many good people might disapprove." We must assume, of course, that he supposes that his "good people" all recognize the authority of the Christian moral law.

When attempting any estimate of Probabilism it is necessary to bear in mind that the point at issue is not: What is the highest course for me to pursue? but: May I lawfully follow this particular course without committing sin? Even then the real difficulty remains—namely, that a less probable opinion may be followed even when the opposing view is more probable. Naturally, all probabilists attempt to meet this difficulty, but it would be impossible in an outline such as this to do more than glance at their arguments. The most complete defence of the system is to be found in Lehmkuhl's *Probabilismus Vindicatur*.

Here is one line of approach. We must admit that the greater probability of one opinion does not *ipso facto* destroy the probability of its contrary. Arguing from this, Fr. Davis concludes: "Therefore it must be admitted that in the conflict of two opposite probable opinions, since either may be false, it is not paradoxical to say that the less probable opinion may be the true one." This, he says, is a fundamental presupposition of Probabilism, and it is reasonable. A further contention of the probabilists is that if an opinion favouring liberty is truly and solidly probable (and it must be, if we are to follow it with a good conscience), then it is so because the law itself is doubtful, or insufficiently promulgated. Now, moralists in

general agree that a doubtful law is not binding on the conscience, hence the axiom *Lex dubia non obligat*, and therefore one may decide in favour of liberty against the law.

In spite of these and other arguments in support of Probabilism, there remain moralists of repute who cannot admit that they remove the moral objection against following a *less* probable opinion when it is acknowledged that its opposite is recognized to be *more* probable. These emphasize the principle that it is the moral duty of a Christian always to try to bring his conduct into harmony with objective morality; but if he follows the less probable opinion he is neglecting this duty and therefore acts unlawfully. It is useful to note that in practice the real point at issue in the majority of cases is not actually whether it is "safe" to break the law, or to decide for "liberty" against the law, but which of two laws has the stronger claim—the law, for example, of abstaining from servile work on Sunday, and the law of charity which claims that the needs of a sick person should be attended to. A recognition of this fact helps to remove misunderstandings regarding the use of the words "safe" and "liberty"; to choose "the less safe opinion" is not necessarily an evasion of the law, nor a surrender to opportunism.

Before considering the alternative offered by those theologians who cannot accept the probabilist position, one other matter must be cleared out of the way. As we have seen, probabilists do not claim more for their system than that it applies to all cases of doubt where there is a question of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an action. They recognize that there are other cases where absolute certainty is demanded, and therefore, when they arise, Probabilism cannot be used. These cases fall into three groups. The first is concerned with the validity of the sacraments. Obviously, there can be no question of the benefit of the doubt here. It is necessary for their validity that certain specific conditions should be observed in the administration of the sacraments. We can imagine a case arising where altogether abnormal circumstances force a priest to administer, say, Baptism with "matter" which is doubtful; but in such a case the Baptism will remain doubtful, and no arguments in favour of its probable validity will make it certainly valid.

The second class refers to the attainment of an obligatory end, such as the salvation of our souls. A simple example should make this clear. A Christian doubts seriously whether, in his case, prayer "is any good." Can he avail himself of the benefit of the doubt? The answer, in the words of Dr. Kirk, from whom I have borrowed the illustration, is that prayer

is obviously a matter which, if necessary at all, directly concerns the whole moral life in its most essential particulars. Consequently, no mere doubt as to its utility or reasonableness can exempt an earnest-minded man from continuing at all events to try to pray. The third class concerns the established rights of our fellow-men, and here again we may use a simple illustration. A druggist makes up a prescription which contains a deadly poison, and after dispensing the medicine he doubts if he measured the quantity of the poison correctly. He must not here exercise the benefit of the doubt and take the risk; for the life of a fellow-man may be at stake, and consequently it is unlawful to omit every reasonable precaution.

We are now in a position to discuss the alternative to Probabilism. This is the system known as Equiprobabilism. It occupies a place midway between Probabiliorism and Probabilism, and its principles aim at correcting the defects which are believed to exist in each system. Equiprobabilism teaches (i.) that when the existence of a law is in question it is lawful to follow the less safe opinion, provided it has equal or nearly equal probability with the safe opinion; (ii.) that it is not lawful to act on the less safe opinion, even when it is equally probable with the safe opinion, if the uncertainty is in regard to the cessation of a law—that is, when the doubt is whether a definite law has ceased to bind or not; and (iii.) that it is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion when the safe opinion is certainly more probable.

These principles are, necessarily, framed in technical language. The meaning of the third seems fairly obvious, but specific examples may serve to illustrate how the first and second can be applied. Example of (i.): Smith is doubtful if the eve of a particular saint's day is a fast or not. He cannot obtain sure information on the matter, but he is bound to act, as tomorrow is the eve. Here the existence of the law is in question, and he may take the benefit of the doubt and eat flesh meat, if the probability is equal or nearly equal. Example of (ii.): Brown knows that the kalendar of the days of fasting and abstinence has been revised. He is certain that the fast in question was ordered by the old kalendar, but he is doubtful if it is omitted in the revised kalendar. Since his doubt is whether a definite law has ceased to bind or not, and the conflict of opinion in his case is of equally or nearly equally probable opinions, he should follow the safe course and observe the fast, because the law is in possession.

I hope no one will consider these examples as trivial, although they may possibly be inadequate; in an article such as this one is bound to choose simple illustrations, for any discus-

sion of complicated cases of conscience is out of the question. The significance of the equiprobabilist system should now be evident. The first principle mitigates the severity of Probabiliorism, while the second and third remove the objections which are advanced against Probabilism. Thus, the advocates of Equiprobabilism claim that their system provides an escape from the hardships of rigorism on the one hand and the dangers of laxism on the other.

Certain probabilist critics complain that Equiprobabilism is too complicated; but this exaggerates the demands made by the system on those who use it. All that is required is that the arguments on both sides should be examined impartially, and a decision made to the best of one's ability. My own experience has led me to the conclusion that the majority of Anglican confessors, either deliberately or unconsciously, base their decisions in cases of doubt on the principles of Equiprobabilism. I have tried to follow the system to the best of my ability for nearly twenty-five years, and I have found it of great practical value.

It has been impossible, even in an outline such as this, entirely to avoid the use of technical terms; for moral theology, in common with all the sciences, is unable to dispense with such terms. One who treats his moral obligations lightly will be impatient of technical arguments and definitions; but the conscientious Christian, who desires to avoid sin and to serve God faithfully, will strive to regulate his actions according to sound moral principles, and he will be grateful to moralists who attempt to help him to arrive at a decision based on reason and not on mere caprice.

The reader who wishes to study the subject further and at first hand will find the literature alarmingly voluminous, so I would conclude with a short selected bibliography. A start may be made with the article on "Probabilism" in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*. McHugh and Callan, in their *Moral Theology*, set forth the arguments for and against the various systems in detail, and sum up in favour of Probabilism. Dr. Kirk's *Conscience and its Problems* takes particular notice of Anglican doubts. Lehmkuhl powerfully defends Probabilism in the 1910 edition of his *Theologia Moralis*, and in the treatise *Probabilismus Vindicatus* mentioned above. Fr. H. Davis also supports Probabilism in his new work *Moral and Pastoral Theology*. A clear and well-reasoned statement in favour of Equiprobabilism is to be found in Marc's *Institutiones Morales*. A new system, called Compensationism, which I have not been able to discuss owing to lack of space, is demonstrated with great ability by Prümmer in his *Manuale Theologiæ Moralis*.

FRANCIS G. BELTON.

THE GLORY OF THE HOUSE OF DAVID*

To-NIGHT I want to talk about birthdays in general and then about one birthday in particular. There are people who do not care about birthdays. They give all sorts of reasons why they do not like them, but I believe the real reason is that they do not like to be reminded that they are getting older and older and older. I have never heard of children not caring about their birthdays. Personally, I delight in mine. Each year it is delightful to get the loving or kind good wishes from it may be old friends or it may be from comparatively new friends, but from whichever it may be, it is nice to be remembered. Then there are the presents; these too are an excitement, and best of all there are those who remember you in their prayers, especially those who made their Communion for you at the altar that morning. Affection and love are the greatest things in this life, and affection and love follow us into the other world, for the prayers of those on earth are helping the soul that has passed out of this life. As children do we not remember the excitement in preparing some present or other for our mother? How when she came into the room we hid whatever it was, and the dear loving soul pretended that she had seen nothing, though I expect she knew perfectly well all about it. Then the present itself: it may have been a kettle-holder done in cross-stitch, a black kettle on a red ground and the words "Polly put the kettle on" underneath. Possibly rather crookedly worked, probably not at all what our mother would have chosen, *but* we had *done our best*; every stitch told of our love, and our mother liked it because of the *intention* and quite apart from the thing itself.

As we get on in life, one birthday has hardly passed when it seems as if the next one has arrived. It was quite different when we were very young, for then it seemed as if the next birthday would never come. Surely it is, or it ought to be, a comfort to feel that the time when we "go home" is getting nearer and nearer. Of course I do not mean that we ought not to enjoy this life. God wants us to be happy, and the greatest saints are the people who have been happiest, very often with precious little, so far as we can see, to make them happy. This life seems to me so like the entrance-rooms to some great palace entertainment. The rooms are very pleasant, the company quite agreeable, but nothing to compare to the great throne-room where the King and his court await the guests.

And now I want to talk about the one birthday in particular

* A lay sermon preached in a village church on September 8 (Nativity of B.V.M.). Printed this month in anticipation of December 8.

which we are keeping today—a birthday which is not only being kept in Froyle, but throughout the Christian world—the birthday of the Mother of God. In your Prayer Book Calendar you will find it under September 8: "Nativity of the Virgin Mary," or, to quote the words from the service with which your and my ancestors were familiar, "This is the Nativity of the glorious Virgin Mary, of the seed of Abraham, born of the tribe of Judah, of the noble race of David."

You may ask me what do we actually know for certain about the birth and youth of the Blessed Virgin, and the answer is "Very little for certain now." What we know comes from a book written about the second century. Probably a great deal is true, and perhaps some of it is doubtful tradition, but here it is. In Nazareth lived a man called Joachim married to one Anna of Bethlehem, both of them aged. Both of them, though poor, were of the royal race of David. Now the Jews paid great honour to those who had children and withheld this honour from the childless. Anna prays that God would take away this reproach, for so it was considered by the Jews. God hears her prayer, as He did in the case of Hannah (you will find that in 1 Samuel i.). And when she knew that she was about to have a child she vowed to dedicate to God's service that child, whether a son or a daughter. A daughter is born to Joachim and Anna, and they give the child the name of Mary. Then when she is three years old they take her to the Temple in Jerusalem and place her at the foot of the steps leading up to the altar. The child Mary goes up these steps and dances for joy in front of the altar. Now this is quite natural, for I have seen a child of five do exactly the same thing and dance with pleasure in front of a Christian altar. Then time goes on, and Mary is chosen by lot to be one of those who wove and embroidered the great purple hangings of the Temple. You will find all about the hangings in Exodus xxxvi. And then when Mary was fourteen the time according to the Jews came when she should be betrothed, and the legend says that St. Joseph was chosen from among all the other young men because his staff only amongst theirs had blossomed.

From now onwards we are on firm ground, for the Holy Gospels take up the narrative. From them we know of the Annunciation, how Mary conceived by the Holy Ghost, of her visit to her cousin Elizabeth, of how she brought forth the Son of God. How He, obedient to the law, was circumcised the eighth day and called Jesus; how the Holy Family fled into Egypt to escape from Herod's cruelty and then returned when Herod was dead. How the Holy Family went up to Jerusalem for the Passover, and Jesus, then twelve years old, was lost

and after three days was found by Mary and Joseph in the Temple asking the learned men questions. And then there is a silence. The Holy Family were at Nazareth, Jesus helping His foster-father in the carpenter's shop, for St. Joseph was a carpenter, and we are told nothing till the marriage-feast at Cana in Galilee, when Mary tells the servants to do whatever her divine Son tells them to do. We hear no more of Mary till we find her at the foot of the Cross on which hangs her divine Son dying for your and my sins and for the sins of the world. For thirty years Mary had Jesus with her; then came the three years of His earthly Ministry. Now once more we come to tradition: how that fifteen years after the Ascension of her divine Son into heaven God called Mary to Himself, and she too was received into Heaven, never more to be separated from her Lord and her God and our Lord and our God.

This is what we know of Mary, either by tradition or from the Holy Gospels. Whether or no the traditions are actual fact I do not think matters in the least. They are certainly some seventeen hundred years old, and they are full of beautiful lessons for us. What is quite certain is this: that on the birth-day of the Mother of God we ought in the first place to praise and bless God for all the graces that He gave her—how that He prepared her from her very conception to be a worthy dwelling for His Son. In the second place to honour Him in the Blessed Virgin for all His wonders by which He prepared the way for our Redemption. Inspired by the Holy Ghost, she said, "All generations shall call me blessed." And so indeed we do, for consider her *dignity* as the Mother of God, her *sanctity* as having been chosen to bear the Holy One, her *elevation* to the glory of heaven. God is the sole author and the original source of all the *dignity*, *sanctity* and *glory* of Blessed Mary, and so all the honour which the Church pays to her is glory and honour to God Almighty. Now true devotion loves, esteems and honours in her that which God loves, esteems and honours, and surely we cannot shew our love, esteem and honour for virtue and sanctity better than by trying to imitate them.

I talked about birthday presents. Often they take the form of a nosegay of flowers. It seems to me that this is a good spiritual nosegay:

The lily of *Purity*,
The rose of *Love*,
The violet of *Humility*,
The heartsease of *Kindly Acts*,
The snowdrops of *Modesty*,
Sweet verbena and lavender of a *broken and contrite heart*; and remember, we must have that.

You may say that all these flowers are not in bloom at the same time. No, they are not; but the virtues that they represent are, thank God, in flower spring, summer, autumn and winter, if we will only cultivate them; and though the blossoms may be small and poor, if we have done our best and if our intention is for God's honour and glory, He will bless our endeavours, and may His Holy Mother's prayers help us for Jesus' sake.

C. J. HUBERT MILLER.

MISCELLANEA

WHO IS THEIR FATHER?

1 SAM. x. 12: "And one of the same place answered and said, And who is their father?"

This question has puzzled the commentators. Smith in I.C.C. says that the clause is "perfectly plain in meaning in itself considered, but entirely unintelligible in this context. . . . The original reading seems to be lost." The S.P.C.K. commentary passes over it in silence. Peake's one volume commentary remarks: "Respectable people, of good family, with a 'father,' did not join in the antics of these mad fanatics—that would be the common view." R.V.M. ref. is edifying but unconvincing.

Peake seems on the right track; and it is superfluous to suggest, as Smith does, that the text is corrupt.

Light is thrown on the question by a recent book *Abyssinian Journey*, by Marcel Griaule, translated by E. G. Rich (John Miles, 1935). On p. 59 the author is describing a quarrel.

"The two men became as stiff as small soldiers made out of hard leather, chins forward, teeth set. 'Where is your father?' they growled at the same time. Which is a terrible insult."

Further on, the author describes the behaviour of a man who had let some animals get loose through his own carelessness. He felt, as we should say, ready to kick himself; he ran about the camp shouting "Who is my father?"

Apparently an expression which has gone out of use in Jewish circles has survived amongst the partly Semitic inhabitants of Abyssinia. If so, we have in 1 Sam. x. 12, not a question demanding an answer, but a cut-and-dried formula of acute disparagement.

A parallel to this is the fact that folk-songs have been recovered from the descendants of colonists in the Appalachian Mountains in America which had been lost in England. The same, I am told, is true of some Swedish folk-songs and folk-lore.

J. G. WALKER.

NOTE ON THE INTERPRETATION OF MATTHEW XIX. 10-12.

MANY of those who believe that celibacy is a counsel of perfection and a state of life superior to marriage appear to have been misled by a false interpretation of Matt. xix. 10-12. In the well-known saying about divorce which immediately precedes this passage our Lord declared that marriage was God's will for man and something for which a man should be prepared to sacrifice everything—even the most sacred ties (Matt xix. 4, 5). But in St. Matthew's version of the incident Christ's unequivocal statement about the importance of marriage is followed by one which is supposed to shew that He saw in celibacy something "better than the best." Although some commentators appear to be aware of a certain inconsistency they fail to see the contradiction that the usual interpretation involves.

In answer to the question about divorce our Lord lays down the prin-

ciple that the divine ideal of marriage is a lifelong union between one man and one woman and that all divorce violates this ideal. Then we read verse 10: "The disciples (amazed at our Lord's strictness) say unto him, If the case of a man is so with his wife, it is not expedient to marry. 11 But he said unto them, All men cannot receive this saying but they to whom it is given. 12 For there are eunuchs, which were so born from their mother's womb: and there are eunuchs, which were made eunuchs by men: and there are eunuchs, which made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake. He that is able to receive it, let him receive it."

Now most commentators make the mistake of thinking that "this saying," which "all men cannot receive," is the disciples' saying that it is not expedient to marry. Such a view is ridiculous because it makes Christ say "Marriage is the ideal, but all men can't avoid it" (*i.e.*, can't receive your saying that it is better not to marry). Such a statement is merely stupid. Of course "this saying" must refer to Christ's important saying about marriage, which seemed to the disciples to set too high a standard, and so they suggested celibacy as the safer course—not as a counsel of perfection but of despair!

In his saying about eunuchs Christ is supposed to refer to them as spiritual giants who can accept an ideal which is too exacting for the majority. Such a view is inconsistent with the rest of the passage, but was perhaps suggested by the concluding phrase, "He that is able to receive it, let him receive it."

But, however Christ used this phrase, He cannot posibly have meant that all those who were able to do so should become eunuchs. If the phrase refers to the eunuchs at all it must refer to all the three types mentioned by Christ, and so it involves Christ in the absurd saying, "He that can be born physically incapable of marriage (a eunuch from his mother's womb), let him be."

The key to the interpretation of this passage is to realize that the eunuchs are mentioned as examples of people who *cannot* receive Christ's saying about marriage and *not* of people who can receive the disciples' saying about avoiding marriage. It is quite possible that the concluding phrase "He that is able to receive it, let him receive it," is, like the phrase "He that hath ears to hear let him hear," an isolated saying and has been inserted here by the evangelist.

If the interpretation which we have suggested is correct, the passage becomes intelligible. Christ says that marriage is the ideal for man, but some are born or become physically incapable of it, while others are voluntary celibates "for the kingdom of heaven's sake." The phrase "for the kingdom of heaven's sake" is to be interpreted in the light of Mark ix. 43-47. On the principle of true asceticism anything that keeps us back from God and perfection must be surrendered. Thus Christ shews that the proper course for those who cannot live up to the ideal of marriage is to abstain from it.

In these days of false standards and moral uncertainty there is a crying need for a high ideal of marriage. Christians believe that our standard should be nothing less than that of our Lord Himself. But how were we to apply this to marriage while it was believed that He taught us to think of it as inferior to celibacy and while we accepted St. Paul's view that it was definitely a sign of weakness? The Christian doctrine of marriage has undoubtedly been hampered by the thought

that Christ really preferred celibacy; it should reassure us to know that, far from being a ruthless ascetic, He regarded marriage as God's ideal for man and recommended it to a humanity from whom He asks nothing less than perfection.

NOTE ON DALMANUTHA, MK. VIII. 10

Dalmanutha has given a deal of geographical trouble to commentators. But perhaps we can banish it from all its disputed positions upon the map, in the manner following:

Remark first the readings *μέρη* and *ὅρια*; these are common words and are not likely to have been confused; can we therefore find some phrase which can account for both?

Look next at the variants Magada (with its many spellings) and Magdala; can we include both in our reading? Consider that the less known Magada or Magadan received a note in the margin explaining its relation to the better known Magdala:

ﻣﺠﺪﻝ ﻗﻨﻮﻧﻴﻞ (=*quod est iuxta partes*).

and at once you have by a transliteration *Δαλμανουθά*. The passage then ran

ΕΤΘΤCΕΜΒΑC
ΑΤΤΟCΕΙCΤΟ
ΠΛΟΙΟΝΜΕΤΑ
ΤΩΝΜΑΘΗΤΩΝ
ΑΤΤΟΤΗΛΘΕΝ
ΕΙCΜΑΓΑΔΑΝ
ΔΑΛΜΑΝΟΤΘΑ
ΜΑΓΔΑΛΑ.

Another reader chose to reinterpret, writing at the edge EIC TA MEPH; a third scribe preferred for his copy EIC TA ΟPIA: hence the divergence in those unimportant words, which then crept into the text. Finally, copyists made their selection from the proper names Magadan and Magdala with the un-proper name Dalmanutha, according as their confused eyes happened to fall upon the closely repeated syllables ΜΑΓ and ΔΑΛ.

P. R. B. Brown.

Note.—The above was written without access to works of reference; but it has since been pointed out that Dalman has a similar theory in the *Expository Times*, October, 1897, ix. 45; *cf.* November, 1897, p. 95. Dalman, in his *Sacred Sites and Ways*, p. 126, notes that Magdala was also known as Magdal Nunaiya, whence (p. 128) possibly Dalmanutha.

CORRESPONDENCE

CONCERNING CERTAIN HYMNS BY WOMEN

SIR,

Mr. Rowland Grey made no mention of a notable woman hymn writer some of whose hymns will be found in the Olavian Hymnal. Two of these are notable. One is unique in that its theme is Motherhood. W. G. Rushbrooke told me that it was written at his suggestion; the other is a stately composition well worthy of a place in modern hymn-books. It begins:

God hath His solitudes, unpeopled yet
  Save by the peaceful life of bird and flower,
Where, since the world's foundations, He hath set
  The hiding of His power.

I quote also the last four stanzas:

The smallest cloudlet, wrecked in distant storms,
  That wanders homeless through the summer skies,
Is reckoned in His purposes, and forms
  One of is argosies.

Where the perpetual mountains patient wait,
  Girded with purity, before His throne,
Keeping from age to age inviolate
  Their everlasting crown;

Where the long-gathering waves of ocean break
  With ceaseless music o'er untrodden strands;
From isles that day by day in silence wake,
  From earth's remotest lands,—

The anthem of His praise shall uttered be,
  All works created on His name shall call,
And laud and bless His holy name, for He
  Hath pleasure in them all.

This hymn was a great joy to me in my boyhood and is still dear. Its author was Mary Rowles Jarvis, born 1853. I believe she died some five years ago.

Yours faithfully,
F. POTTO HICKS.

THE VICARAGE,
CINDERFORD, GLOS.

A NOTE FOR A REVISED BURIAL OFFICE

SIR,

Many other priests have doubtless known the kind of experience and felt the kind of need with which this letter is concerned. There has just passed within the veil a woman, kind and friendly, a good wife and a good mother to her young family, but not one who would have been called particularly holy or religious six months ago.

But during a painful and distressing illness she advanced to a very intimate knowledge and love of our Lord. Fear and apprehension for the future gave way to such deep trust and such complete self-surrender that she has radiated out a truly wonderful influence on others. Members

of her family, neighbours who came in contact with her, friends who received letters from her and, not least, the priest who was privileged to minister to her—all have felt our Lord's influence working through her and have had their own spiritual lives enriched.

We buried her poor, spent body with all the grand and consoling rites which the Church provides for such an occasion, and we found in them comfort, confidence, serenity and the assurance of her triumph through suffering. But one note was missing. There was no word of praise and thanks for such a consummation of life as this, unless it was in the penultimate paragraph of the 1928 Prayer for the Church at the Requiem, or in the first of the prayers for the departed in the 1928 Occasional Prayers. But somehow these seemed at once to say too little and to claim too much.

Does this letter speak for others also if it claims that here is a need some future revision of the Burial Office ought to supply? Do readers of THEOLOGY know of any such thanksgiving from ancient sources, or have we no "liturgical spirits" who can frame us one today?

And might we not also have authorized for use an Anglican version of the Roman Proper Preface for a Requiem?

Yours, etc.,
SACERDOS INDIGNUS.

BERNARD OF CLUNY

REVEREND SIR,

In the interesting article of your last number "Concerning Certain Hymns by Women," Bernard of Cluny is mentioned as a canonized saint. As far as I can discover he was never canonized, and his more usual name is Bernard of Murles, or Morlas.

Yours in Dnō,
CHAD HOLDEN, O.S.B.

THE ABBEY,
ALTON, HANTS.
November 6th.

REVIEWS

THE LIFE OF CHARLES GORE. By G. L. Prestige. Heinemann. 18s.

RANDALL DAVIDSON, ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY. By G. K. A. Bell. Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 2 vols. 36s.

There are doubtless many different ways of writing good biography. Two of them are excellently illustrated in the books that lie before us. Dr. Prestige has used the marking, learning and inwardly digesting method. He has not quoted much. He has availed himself of a great many authorities, and is far from having fallen into the error of substituting an impressionist portrait for a fact-based and fact-filled narrative, but the evidence has passed through his own mind, and what we have is an interpretation. And a very good one. There were some who, when it became known that he was to be the biographer of the beloved Bishop, had their misgivings. Was he familiar enough with the whole of what the Bishop stood for? Did he carry guns enough, and of metal heavy enough, to reach all the targets? Those who were uneasy on this score have been triumphantly reassured. The book is a first-class piece of work. It must have been most difficult. There were a range and a depth in the mind of Bishop Gore which were enough to tax the powers of anyone. The biographer seems to fail here and there, as who would not? It is not part of the real picture of the man as a whole when he is shewn standing on Lambeth Bridge "against a sombre sunset, shaking his fist at Lambeth Palace, to the open-mouthed amazement of passing Londoners, and crying: 'As for the Bishops, they are hopeless; I have done with them.'" For this was only a passing moment of despair. Much more characteristic is the scene by the bookstall in Liverpool Cathedral—"I wonder what is going to be the end of this American religion. Even Davidson of Lambeth cannot see through it. I go and lam at him for half an hour, and he says, 'I must admit there is a great deal in what you say.' But as soon as I have cut and run, he lapses back to where he was before." Or even better, a story from the other book. Bishop Gore is speaking to a friend. "When I go up the stairs at Lambeth, I say, *Charles, you be very careful.* When I come down the stairs, I say, *Charles, you know you never meant to agree to that.*" Yet to have admitted here and there an ill-advised snapshot, which is actually corrected by the universal tenor of the book

itself, is but a tiny blemish. The book as a whole gives a profoundly interesting and not unworthy picture of a great character.

More serious, and yet probably inevitable, is this. Dr. Prestige does not reveal—perhaps no one could, because Bishop Gore himself never knew it, and there is therefore no record of it—how it was that the Lux Mundi pioneer became the defender. For defender, after 1889, he was. Utterly sincere, accustomed to read with perfect freedom every sort of critical or destructive book, as well as fiction and general literature, and therefore well aware of what was being said, constantly rebottoming (his own phrase) his theological beliefs, and in his last big book breaking ground that was in one sense wholly fresh, he never told us how to meet the new things for the old purpose in a new way. He was not an Origen, nor even a Richard Hooker. He was rather an Irenæus. Or, to put it in another way, he was Æschylus rather than Euripides; but he was not that rarest of all things, a combination of them both. Dr. Prestige does not quite explain this. He gives us all the facts. One of the merits of the book is the clear understanding of theological problems which it shews. But he does not make perfectly clear to us what happened. Was it, as one discerning friend has suggested, that Liddon's distress in 1889 was so painful a shock to him that he developed a sort of Never Again complex, and that his transparently honest answers to his own question "Can we still believe?" were at least partially determined by causes which were unknown to himself?

But to ask for this is to ask for everything. It is to ask for the perfect biography. This one is full of excellence. Another of its great merits is that it exhibits the Bishop as first and foremost a prophet of righteousness. This, we are persuaded, was his real life. It is true, of course, that he was a great worshipper. As Dr. Prestige puts it, his prayers were the most important thing in his life. No one who was ever present while he was celebrating the Holy Communion, or saying the Litany, or indeed any prayers, is ever likely to forget it. He worshipped because he could not help it, because every strain in him went out in eager adoration to the revealed God of the Bible and the Church, God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. But his worship was intensely ethical. It was an affair of will and mind and conscience rather than of the emotions. Balliol, which sometimes seems to overdo it, did that for him with singular success. No one could call him sentimental. And the reason why he wanted the Church to be sure of itself, to be definite ("not so much more Christians as better ones"), to stand on a clear creed and a compact

membership, was that the Church might act in the world as the terrifying, teaching, healing, edifying, redeeming instrument which it was meant to be, the Body of Christ. All this the biographer wisely and understandingly sets forth in the illuminating and converting pages of an admirable book.

The method of the other book, which, intricate as it is, was perhaps easier to write, is different. It is not an interpretation, but a record. And yet it interprets. The Bishop of Chichester quotes largely from documents, the Archbishop's own letters, letters written to him by every sort of correspondent from Monarchs and Prime Ministers to lunatics, memoranda prepared by him for the instruction of posterity, speeches and other sources of official information. There is nobody else who could have done it half so well. His own experience at Lambeth, and later at Canterbury, has given Dr. Bell peculiar advantages, but he has used them with something like genius. Some tastes will find his pages overloaded with documents, but they are arranged with extraordinary skill, and it is easy to see that an immense amount of work lies behind the smoothly-flowing narrative. The first impression produced is one of the Archbishop's incredible industry. Some of us had thought that we knew or could guess the extent of his duties, but the facts disclosed are beyond all that we had imagined. In 1928, just before he retired, he said, "While my mind can grasp one thing, it cannot grasp six or seven almost simultaneously, as it ought to be able to do, and as it could do in the past." That this was no idle boast is amply proved by the sheer facts of the record. Twice in the book there is a passing mention of the numerous matters to which he attended in a single day. Any two of them would seem to most of us a day's work. The chapters, one after another, given to major problems shew how arduous his life was. He was a whole Cabinet in himself, and he never had the rest of going into Opposition. Among the chapter-headings are the following: The Life of Archbishop Tait, The Clash with Father Dolling, the Royal Commission on Ecclesiastical Discipline, Chinese Labour, The Education Controversy, The Fifth Lambeth Conference, The People's Budget, The Constitutional Crisis, The Parliament Act, Clerical Orthodoxy, Kikuyu, The Irish Crisis, The War (many chapters), The National Mission, Reservation, Conscientious Objectors, The Hereford Bishopric, The Enabling Act, The Welsh Church, The Sixth Lambeth Conference, Bishop Mathew, the Russian Church, The Assyrian Church, Episcopal Appointments, Malines, The General Strike, Bishop Barnes, Prayer Book Revision. To all these topics, and to many, many more, the Archbishop gave the same scrupulous, conscientious care. He never at-

tempted to decide anything or to advise anyone about anything until he had informed himself about the facts. And in most discussions he probably knew the case of the other person as well as, or even better than, the other person knew it himself. Balfour said after a talk with him in 1901 that he had "the art of stating with great clearness and sympathy the gist of opinions from which he differs: so that I really understand more of Halifax's position now than I think I did before."

Next, there is produced a quite extraordinary impression of his judgment and capacity. It may have seemed at the time to many who can remember the incidents that he was mistaken in some of the conclusions to which he came. But there were constant occasions on which he was content to be misjudged at the time, because it was not expedient to reveal *urbi et orbi* all the evidence which had come before him, or because he did not care simply to defend himself. Those who may still be disposed to think that he was wrong about Father Dolling, or Kikuyu, or Malines, may be advised to read what is here written. It does not at all follow that they will conclude that he was right, but it is certain that they will see that he considered the whole matter with the most anxious care, according to principles that he had formed about the nature and vocation of the Church of England, and that he was both just and consistent. He was also singularly open-minded. He was perhaps overmuch given to consult others, but among those whom he did consult were often quite young people. Because he was genuinely alive, he went on growing all his life. And he grew into the wisest Briton of his time. Superficial observers in the early stages said that he owed his advancement to the fact that he had been Chaplain to Archbishop Tait and had married the Archbishop's daughter. These things doubtless were occasions which caused him to be known, but, as we look back, we can see that his merit and capacity were really irresistible. Scott Holland thought in January, 1903, that Bishop Edward Talbot ought to have been sent to Canterbury, but we can see now, as Holland probably did before he passed from us, that he was mistaken. There are in the book innumerable tributes to the effect that Davidson was the one man for the place. They include two of great interest from Lord Halifax and Bishop Gore, and it does not seem doubtful that Bishop Frank Weston would have said just the same. The moderate Evangelicals would have agreed heartily, but militant Protestants, though sharing in the general regard for the man, were disappointed in the way in which he developed.

Dr. Bell has produced a *magnum opus*. He lets us see the power of the man and his consummate wisdom. But he also

shews the man's perpetual, unfailing piety. Of this, and of his pastoral regard for simple people, perhaps the best examples are the exquisite and brotherly advice that he gave to the newly-consecrated Bishop of Hereford in 1918 and the sermons that he gave to the clergy of the diocese of Canterbury at the beginning of the National Mission in 1916. It is plain that he lived an intensely humble, prayerful, godly life. This is shewn in the book in a simple, unobtrusive way. Another thing which is shewn, and can afford to be shewn—and the mention of it entails no unpleasant revelations—is the part played by the Archbishop in filling appointments. The book includes many of what are in effect judgments on living people and some who have died quite lately, but there is nothing which anyone could wish unsaid. Here and there it is obvious that discretion has been used by the biographer, but the gaps in the story are never of the kind that suggest that something has been suppressed in the interests of the Archbishop, only that someone else's feelings have been spared.

Finally, Dr. Bell has not refrained from interpretation when it seems to him that such is required. He is naturally an admirer, but he is not uncritical. He has a most discerning analysis of the Archbishop's qualified interest in Prayer Book Revision. "The Archbishop could not bring himself to believe that the revision of the Prayer Book was in fact a vital matter to the Church. Not believing it himself, he lacked the fire to convince others, especially the House of Commons. To acknowledge this is not to say that the Archbishop was wrong because of this lack of interest or conviction. His religious interests were of a more general, even a broader character." A letter to Sir William Joynson-Hicks, which seemed to its recipient "not to deal with the matter quite so fully" as a conversation of a few days before had done, Dr. Bell pronounces "unsatisfactory," and even "a kind of climax to the danger that lay in the Archbishop's habit of mind, especially when engaged upon an uncongenial subject." But to include this is to supply just that amount of interpretation which is needed to save a biography from being a mere record. What Dr. Bell has done is to produce an exceedingly important biography of a man who was a great Christian and, though not in the Bensonian sense a great ecclesiastic, a great Churchman. His *Life* will become part of the history of the Church of England and of England.

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immense congregation which had assembled, not on the Christian doctrine which seemed appropriate to the day, but on the lessons of Empire Day. It was evident that he considered that the great majority of those to whom he was speaking were not, and were never likely to be, theologians, and accordingly determined to give them some counsel on the subject of Christian citizenship. The young man, who was at that time rather narrowly ecclesiastical in his outlook, even if not altogether in his interests, was disappointed, but he has often thought about it since and has come to the conclusion that the Archbishop was right. The other reminiscence is not a story of anyone's repentance, only a tribute. Twenty years after the same man was in Toronto. The Principal of Trinity College said to him that he had just received a kind letter from the Archbishop of Canterbury with a donation towards some College Fund for which he was appealing, and added the remark that he thought that the Archbishop knew nearly as much about the Church in Toronto as the Bishop of Toronto knew himself. No sort of criticism was implied of the then Bishop of the diocese. In fact the Principal may have added, though memory does not here serve, that he would have been the first to agree to the tribute paid to the Primate of Canterbury.

S. C. CARPENTER.

SHAKESPEARE'S BIBLICAL KNOWLEDGE. By Richmond Noble. S.P.C.K. 10s. 6d.

If you were to take all the school-children in England, the graduates of Oxford and Cambridge, the members of the London Stock Exchange, the National Council of Women, the Prince of Wales, Dr. Inge, and Mr. H. G. Wells, or any other set of people, or any other individuals, who might represent public opinion, and ask them to give you the greatest name in English literature, they would with one voice shout at you *Shakespeare*.

If, however, you were to pursue the subject further and to enquire Why ? you would be bewildered by the multiplicity of replies. Shakespeare the poet, Shakespeare the dramatist, Shakespeare the revealer of human nature, Shakespeare the patriot, and many another Shakespeare, would all be praised. And when all had been said, a mystery would still remain. We can say why we consider Shakespeare great. Can we quite explain why we love him ?

This book, which is extremely erudite and intended first of all for the scholar, suggests a line of approach for the ordinary lover of Shakespeare. It makes clear to us how well Shakespeare knew his Bible.

The English, when true to type, are a Bible-loving race. The Bible is a national institution. The Englishman, though he will not always admit the fact, dislikes both Criticism and Apologetics. A gentleman, he feels, does not criticize that which makes him what he is; and, like George III. (was it?), he "did not know that the Bible needed any apology."

The statesmen whom the Englishman has most admired have reminded him of Biblical characters. The Art he prefers has a Biblical flavour. The poem of all others which, in my lifetime, has most stirred the nation has been Kipling's *Recessional*. Our professors and our æsthetes are horrified that Marie Corelli and Hall Caine, A. S. M. Hutchinson and John Oxenham should strike chords in the hearts of men and women who ought to know bad Art when they see it. The explanation is simple. The authors in question knew their Bible (and their public).

Shakespeare's Biblical knowledge is, of course, much less on the surface than Milton's—though Milton's not only enriches the surface of his poems, but penetrates into the deepest springs of his thought. It seems in Shakespeare to have been stored, as echoes, in the unconscious mind; and at moments when the impulse of poetic creation was at its strongest, to have come forth in music.

Now, as I said, Mr. Noble has written a very learned book. The University of Liverpool, in awarding him the William Noble Fellowship for 1933-34, enabled him to devote money, time, and thought to investigating the question, How well did Shakespeare know his Bible and the Book of Common Prayer? The evidence accumulated, the exact problems involved, and the conclusions reached, are set out in a clear and interesting manner.

Chapter I. gives a list of Tudor printed versions of Scripture, and an account of the 1559 Prayer Book and of the Homilies.

The second chapter is devoted to general considerations on the extent of Shakespeare's Biblical knowledge. Many people will be surprised to hear that Shakespeare quoted from eighteen books of the Old Testament and eighteen of the New, and from six books of the Apocrypha.

Allusions, of course, are sometimes doubtful. Mr. Noble divides them into three classes—*certain*, *probable*, *possible*—and considers them with examples and explanations. For instance, as *certain* allusions he cites the words of Helena in *All's Well That Ends Well*:

> "So Holy Writ in babes hath judgment shewn,
> When judges have been babes: great floods have flown
> From simple sources: and great seas have dried
> When miracles have by the great'st been denied,"

and identifies these as "the raising up of the young child Daniel in the judgment of Susannah, the abundance of water that flowed from the rock smitten by Moses, and the drying of the waters of the Red Sea" (conclusions which no one, I think, would challenge).

The next chapter discusses the five different ways in which Shakespeare might have learned to know his Bible. These are: (1) By reading the Bible. (2) By hearing the Bible read in church or elsewhere. (3) By hearing Homilies, preachers' texts, and passages quoted in services. (4) In the course of general secular reading. (5) In the course of general conversation.

Mr. Noble is inclined to think that the Book of Job and Ecclesiasticus made special appeal to Shakespeare. Certainly, interesting parallels might be drawn between the characters of the author of the Book of Job and the character of the English dramatist.

The discussion as to which version of the Bible Shakespeare used is of less interest to the general reader, who perhaps, like the reviewer, will not plough through the amazingly full list of Biblical and Liturgical references.

The impression which remains is, however, overwhelming. Shakespeare did, indeed, know his Bible, with a thoroughness and a precision which astonishes us. But what did he think of it? We do not know.

What, if it comes to that, were the judgments that Shakespeare passed on human nature and on life? They elude us.

We have his characters—Caliban, Ariel; Lady Macbeth, Imogen; Falstaff, Hamlet; and, towering above them all, by virtue of his self-made tragedy, King Lear—but we cannot tell which was dearest to their creator. "All the world's a stage," says Shakespeare, as though the unreality of things weighed on him. "Life is a tale told by an idiot." Had he sought a harmony and found none?

"When I consider Thy heavens," said the psalmist, "the work of Thy fingers, the moon and the stars which Thou hast ordained; what is man, that Thou art mindful of him? and the son of man that Thou visitest him?"

Shakespeare, coming away from the crowded playhouse, went apart and looked up at the stars. To him, too, they declared the glory of God.

"*Such harmony is in immortal souls.*" (Is that the reason why we love him?)

ÆLFRIDA TILLYARD.

NOTICES

Polarity. By P. Erich Przywara. Translated by A. C. Bouquet, D.D. Oxford University Press. Pp. 150. 8s. 6d.

In the last December number of Theology Dr. Bouquet expressed regret that Fr. Przywara's book could not at present see the light in a complete English translation, and gave us there himself a detailed analysis and some criticisms of it to stay our appetite. He has now gained our gratitude by removing the cause for regret: we have his complete translation. Over the difficulty of his work, the translator's preface heaves a sigh. Over the cragginess that still remains, the reader will occasionally sigh also, for Dr. Bouquet has found literal translation the only way to deal with so compact and so elaborately schematized a work. It is possible to see one's way through by a sort of mathematical hard thinking, for the density is born of compression, not confusion: Fr. Przywara has thought his way into every cranny of his labyrinthine structure, and it is possible to follow him; and if it is possible, it is certainly worth while.

Those readers who wish to see an analysis of the argument must turn up Dr. Bouquet's December article. Absolved from repeating his work, we content ourselves with reflections on certain aspects of so many-sided a book.

The revived study of Thomism led no doubt at first to a preoccupation with the treasure rediscovered, and a tendency to a stiff Thomist orthodoxy. Attempts to face the modern philosophical temper were not lacking, but did not always convince of inward and sympathetic understanding for it. In Przywara we have a Roman Catholic under strong Thomist influence who has evidently felt the current of contemporary philosophic thought in his very bones. His essay, quite as subtly as Heim's Glaube und Denken, rears the certainty of the Faith out of the actual welter of conflicting opinion.

This betokens in effect the shifting of the evidential basis of Thomism. The tradition takes certain principles as self-evident, and by the force of them lifts us from the existence of the world to that of God. Now once admit the principle of (for example) causality in St. Thomas's sense, and you will probably have to admit also the argument to a First Cause: and, further, that a First Cause standing to the world in the relation implied can be conceived in no other terms than those of the *analogia entis*. But it has become more and more painfully evident that the principle of causality in the sense required by the argument is a specifically metaphysico-religious category with which empirical thought about the world can dispense if it chooses.

Modern Thomists have tried to make a direct defence against this ruinous attack: they have tried to bind up causality (in the required sense) with the Law of Contradiction itself, and have stigmatized all who reject it as irrationalists. They have convinced none but themselves, and left Thomism to appear to rest on a circular argument which proves the existence of God from a principle of causality that is itself a category of Theistic thought.

Now it may well be that Przywara would stand, if challenged, by the absolute validity of the causal arguments: but the general effect of his essay is to place the weight elsewhere. In the whole field of philosophical and religious speculation he shews the tendency of the human mind to seek

the unity of thought and life by absolutizing something, and proceeds to shew that only if this Absolute is found in the truly transcendent (as *analogia entis* alone enables us to conceive it) can that unity be satisfactorily realized. But that is to say that his *datum* is a dynamically conceived human mind which is in fact seeking such a unity: and the Thomist conception of causality can be treated not as the premiss to a demonstration, but as part of the answer to a question. The question is: What Absolute, and what relation between It and the world, can harmonize the conflicting elements of thought and experience? Now the God of Catholicism is the first and the Thomist conception of causality the second, and *analogia entis* the way of conceiving both together.

Thus rational theology comes to be based neither on abstract reason nor on religious consciousness, but on an aspiration and activity of the mind, in which religious devotion and metaphysical speculation are complementary aspects—aspects which should never be allowed to get out of harmony. All men, in so far as they pray, are unconscious analogiasts: *analogia entis* is the undetected formal structure of every living religious thought so far as it is pure. But when men begin to speculate, they too often force the relation between God and the creature into the strait waistcoat of categories which only hold of the relation between one creature and another. Such a one-storey metaphysic is for all Thomists the heresy of heresies. A naïve imposition of creaturely forms distorts the matter of religious belief, and this again reacts on prayer, restraining or corrupting it.

If all prayer worthy of the name has within it the structure of the *analogia entis*, then Catholicism, which makes that structure explicit and builds its philosophy round it, appears as *religio religiosissima*. In the same sense Brémond declares the devotion of Bérulle and Condren to be the most religious form of piety: most expressive, that is, of the nature of piety as such.

From this position Przywara advances a stage further. It is not merely that the *analogia entis* stands revealed as a formal structure identical in all the many varieties of true piety, like a form equally expressible in a variety of materials. This is a form that itself of its own nature breeds the varieties of its own embodiment. He makes it do this by throwing it into "dialectical" motion, after the manner of the Hegelian explanation of history.

It works thus. Take the phrase: "Man is a creature." Underline *creature*, and the all-embracing reality and causality of God swallows us up. Underline *Man is . . .*, and the necessity reasserts itself that man must be something distinct in himself, or the Creator will have been the creator of nothing. And yet we cannot get the "allness" of God and the "someness" of the creature into one picture: that is the inevitable infirmity of the creaturely mind to which precisely the doctrine of *analogia entis* reconciles us. We have here neither a conflict disruptive of reality nor a contradiction destructive of theology. But the tension, accepted as inevitable, remains none the less actual: the religious mind experiences both a necessity and an inability to grasp the reality of God and the creature together, and falls into a rhythm of alternation between the two. This, working itself out in a bewildering variety of connexions, gives us the history of the development of Catholicism.

In consequence Przywara gives us a masterly sketch of the development of Catholic thought and piety, in illustration of this principle,

illuminating in itself, and, by the way, the only true rejoinder to the Protestant critic with his talk of "conflicting tendencies within Catholicism." Przywara is asking in effect whether the alleged "contradictions" in St. Augustine may not be of the same variety as the "contradiction" between God and man.

But—while we are speaking of Protestant criticism—it is just at this point that Przywara seems most obviously to challenge the Barthian attack. We grant that Catholicism is *religio religiosissima*, and has made religiosity the criterion of religion. But that is just the trouble. Religion may be very religious and yet very false: inside religiousness there are many possibilities, only one of which is the true, and that is indicated to us not by the form of the human religious consciousness itself, but by revelation from above. And, on the subject of the dialectic of history, we will admit indeed—none more gladly—that the attempt to express the divine in human terms will lead to the paradox of seeming conflict and an oscillation which constantly seeks the neglected pole of truth. But we must insist that what this dialectical oscillation seeks to express is the supernaturally revealed, and it is intolerable that the mere working out of the possibilities of the form of Religious Consciousness as such should be allowed as a substitute for revelation. And—to complete this line of criticism—it appears that the dialectical principle is in danger of not merely competing with particular revelation, but of sweeping it away in its flow. For are not St. Paul and St. John (as Przywara seems to hint) themselves extremes of dialectical oscillation? Can we then ever use their teaching as normative or condemn discrepance with it? Will not the compensatory swing of the pendulum justify everything? We shall have to deify the whole Catholic consciousness from Abraham to St. Thérèse de Lisieux, and accept equally all that the Church has not explicitly condemned.

Faced with such an attack, Przywara will not abandon his principle that the religious consciousness is from the start some measure of divine revelation. It is the working out in man's awareness of his actual relation to his Creator, and this, looked at from the other side, is the Creator's own act. But this act of God towards the creature is not everywhere the same, and so the creature has not everywhere the same relation to Him of which to be made aware. The successive divine dispensations—especially that in Christ—introduce into that relation real metaphysical differences, so that while dialectical oscillation continues to govern the development of the religious consciousness, there is now something different in kind to find expression through it: a supernatural relation of man to God has been added to the natural.

May we not find in this doctrine what we want—the subjective unity of the whole religious consciousness of man and the reality of natural revelation, and yet the absolute uniqueness of the supernatural revelation in Christ? And this is, as we have already warned the reader, only a specimen of the many-sided thought of the book. It is difficult to believe so much was ever put into so few pages: and nearly all of it managed with an intellectual firmness and mastery which is the rarely-met delight of the theological reader.

AUSTIN FARRER.

THE FALL OF MAN. By H. T. Powell, D.D. S.P.C.K. 5s.

The reader who approaches this book with his hopes raised by Dr. Matthews' Foreword will probably lay it down a disappointed man. For we are left at the end in a state of uncertainty as to whether the author desires to restate or to abandon the Doctrine of the Fall. He vigorously attacks as unscientific Dr. Williams' method in seeking an "irreducible minimum" of truth in the various historical presentations of the doctrine: yet only three pages later he says, "Our task is to discover the meaning that can still be attached to a Fall when due allowance has been made for the contributions of relatively modern thought." He tells us that "Our Lord never described the world as fallen, nor does He appear to have regarded it as such," saying in favour of this that "the world, to His view, was GOD'S world—a manifestation of a loving Father." But would not even St. Augustine have gladly accepted the latter statement without finding it in any way inconsistent with his conviction of the Fall? Again, we are given without discussion or explanation the dogmatic assertion that "Science, with its tale of continuous evolution, has no place for the Doctrine of the Fall." Perhaps a reviewer who can lay no claim to be a scientist may question whether science does bear witness to "continuous evolution," or to a development marked at every stage by the extinction of species which failed to respond to the necessities of changing environment: and in any case is it not the fact that science is concerned only with physical and mental evolution, and is in no way concerned with moral evolution? By such arguments as these Dr. Powell reaches the conclusion on p. 113 that "the Doctrine of the Fall is incongruous and superfluous" in the midst of modern ideas: yet only four pages later he offers us a "restatement" of the doctrine, and speaks of "a natural inclination to remain on the lower level"—which is precisely the fact which the Fall Doctrine attempts to express. This "natural inclination" is again forgotten a few pages later, when we are assured that if we shew Christ to the young, "the response will be spontaneous, for the Spirit within them will move in answer to the telling of the truth." We are left wondering how Dr. Powell reconciles this shallow optimism with the fact that those to whom Christ was first shewn responded by crucifying Him.

The fact seems to be that Dr. Powell starts from the curious presupposition that the Fall Doctrine implies such a failure of the Divine prescience that sin came as a "surprise" to GOD. It is easy to attack such a theory, but it is doubtful whether any exponent of the Doctrine of the Fall has ever held it. It is both easy and popular to-day to criticize the old belief in the Fall of Man, and there is room both for such criticism as that of Dr. Tennant and such defences of the traditional doctrine as those of Dr. Williams and Dr. Bicknell. But the first need is for clear thinking as to what the Fall means, and it is just here that Dr. Powell leaves us disappointed.

PERCY HARTILL.

FROM DYAD TO TRIAD. A Plea for Duality against Dualism and an Essay towards the Synthesis of Orthodoxy. By the Rev. Hieromonk Alexis van der Mensbrugghe. London. The Faith Press. Pp. xxi+153. Price 7s. 6d.

Father Alexis certainly has an unusual equipment for an unprecedented adventure. He belongs to both East and West; to the West

by birth in Belgium and training as one of Cardinal Mercier's monks at Amay, praying for the cause of Reunion to the East as a convinced convert of the Orthodox Communion, marvellously identified in thought and feeling with the ethos of the Russian Church in exile. He thinks now as an Eastern, but beneath his thought is the ground of a Roman education in the exactness of scholasticism. Moreover, he has sounded to the depths the reaches of modern philosophy; he knows exactly how developments from Kant work up to the need of his theory, where Quick and Matthews today or Bradley yesterday fall short, at what points R. S. Franks or Leonard Hodgson may be justly commended. His index shews that he is at home in every region of theology and philosophy.

It is claimed in this "Essay towards the Sythesis of Orthodoxy" that it is a synthesis of all thought on Reality through the recognition of a lost but now recovered principle. Of *all* thought, for theology and philosophy are on one quest, the first deducing truth from an intuitive and revealed knowledge, which the second aims at reaching inductively from the positive data of scientific experience. This application to philosophy lifts the adventure out of the scholastic arena into the highest air of modern metaphysical interest. If it is to be considered important towards the discussion of Binitarianism, the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Word, and the sometimes undefined boundaries between heresy and orthodoxy, it also will illuminate the age-long problem of the One and the Many, the nature of the Absolute, and His relation not only to the stream of temporal things, but also the *circumincessio* in Him of the three Transcendentals intuitively recognized as values—viz., Goodness, Truth, and the Æsthetic (Beauty).

The principle of a duality in the Godhead (as a preparation in thought for the fuller discovery of a Tri-unity) is, we are told, correctly outlined in Justin Martyr, Tatian and Theophilus, and Irenæus. "He distinguishes between the Logos as 'the absolute organ' of all revelations (the Wisdom) from the Son who is the Revelation Itself." It was lost in Tertullian, and in the "impenitent Dualism of Western theology, adhered to and developed by the Cappadocians, by Hilary of Tours, and especially by Athanasius. Through dark ages it was obscured even in the East, but it survived in memory and in the mystic symbolism of iconography. This principle (the solvent of all theological and metaphysical difficulties) was rediscovered and applied by Soloviov, Bulgakov, Berdyaev, Florensky, and Karsavin. It is the *tertium quid* between Far Eastern thought and Western Dualism, which provides "a new type of world-view that is neither monist nor dualist."

There is then Duality in God, and the subordinate essence (for that is its name in contrast to the Transcendent Self-Existent) is the Immanent, the Logos Endiathetos, the Womb from which the Logos Prophorikos is eternally generated as the Cosmic Christ. This "Essence" is she whom the Hebrews knew as Sophia or Wisdom, and (we are told) the Second Person became personal in Creation through her. Once the Dyad is established as a guiding principle of theology, on the basis of Genesis i. 27 ("in the image of God . . . male and female created He them"), the importance of Sophia fades before the glory of the fuller differentiation of the Triad, in which she is seen to be operative eternally but impersonally, and so we reach a full orthodoxy based on what to Western unaccustomed ears seems difficult and somewhat perilous.

The discussions of Idealism on the same basis of a subordinate partner in the Absolute, and of the mutual relations of the Transcendentals, and the description of what the whole course of philosophy from Plato to Hegel has really implied, are full of interest. Father Alexis has a knowledge of nature's mechanism, a ready faculty of illuminating the necessarily abstract by simple concrete analogies, and he gives useful diagrams that express roughly what is meant.

His solutions of the root-problems of philosophy may be accepted or adversely criticized, but at least they make clear what metaphysicians are driving at.

In face of the drawing together today of Orthodox and Anglican, this book is immensely important as a picture of the mystic thought of Eastern thinkers through the ages, and an introduction to categories with which our theology is not at all familiar. It should not only be read, but possessed for frequent reading and discussion, for there is nothing like it in our tongue.

W. J. FERRAR.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE EPISTLES. By William Fairweather, M.A., D.D. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1935. Pp. xxiv+399. 12s.

Dr. Fairweather's book is well conceived, and is full of useful information for those whose education has not made them conversant with the conditions of ancient life and thought. It might have been appreciably shorter, and still have fulfilled its purpose; for a great deal that is here given as background had by apostolic days receded so far into the background as to have very little influence on either the writers or the recipients of the Epistles. The style of the book is somewhat defaced by the use of *cliché* phrases and dead metaphors.

E. EVANS.

THE MODERN APPROACH TO THE OLD TESTAMENT. By the Rev. Jewett C. Townsend. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. Pp. 239. 5s.

This book will be found useful by the pastors and Bible students for whom it is intended, and by the more intelligent type of teacher, if they can bear with a certain amateurishness of sentence construction and other traces of American origin. The time has surely arrived when it is unnecessary to begin a book on this subject with a defence of "criticism": if the legitimacy of it were assumed, most of its processes and conclusions would pass muster with the reader, who is only put on his guard by the suggestion that he is being asked to consider something new, which needs to be defended against the charge of irreligion.

E. EVANS.

THE HISTORICAL ELEMENT IN RELIGION. Lewis Fry Lectures, 1934. By Clement C. J. Webb, F.B.A. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. Pp. 118. 4s. 6d. net.

These five chapters are important not so much because of what is said in them as because Professor Webb has thought it worth while to

say it. The historical element in religion belongs to it in consequence of the social character which belongs to religion itself, and it is probably as an element in religion that history makes its first appearance: for the religious community possesses the tradition of a past which is of importance to its members because they share in its life. In the Christian religion the historical background or basis is of peculiar importance, for if the Old Testament speaks not so much of "timeless realities" as of God transcendent yet at all points conversant with actual human life, in Christianity God's revelation of Himself through contact with human life culminates in the character and life of an individual Person, whose death and resurrection are the grounds of the individual Christian's hopes of forgiveness and eternal life. After criticizing (in the third lecture) the grounds on which the historical element in religion has been discounted by Spinoza, Lessing, Kant, Hegel, Croce, and some modern writers, Dr. Webb presents (in the fourth lecture) his own conclusions regarding its real significance. The historical element in religion is not there as pure history, for religion is not concerned with the past as such but with the past as affecting the religious life of man or community in the present. Christianity, which insists more strongly than other religions on the truth of its historical basis, has for that reason been most profoundly affected by the modern interest in scientific history. But, apart from details which come under criticism, there is a certain general situation, which may be summarized as the historic Jewish background and the historic fact of Christ, the truth of which is vouched for by the general sense of the Christian community as expressed in its continuous historical tradition. This general sense of the community, a sense of men's communion with God and in God with one another, has to be taken into consideration, since knowledge (of any kind) is the fruit not of isolation but of intercourse. In a supplementary chapter Professor Webb, in answer to questions from his audience, discusses the bearing of these conclusions on the attitude to be taken with regard to such events as the virgin birth and resurrection of our Lord, His institution of the Eucharist, and His commission to St. Peter: the second of these is of the essence of the continuous tradition, while the first can hardly have been part of the original preaching of the Gospel: the third has become embedded in the tradition, while the fourth may be of importance in connexion with the assertion that certain institutions are associated with the maintenance of the Christian type of religious experience.

The reviewer (who has the hardihood to regard himself as in some sense one of the Professor's disciples) would venture to ask two questions:

(1) Is not "modern philosophy" becoming so inbred and sterile as to be unworthy of the amount of consideration it sometimes receives? A writer who knows so little of religion as to allow himself to say that it is "what the individual does with his own solitariness" (quoted on p. 14), and another who remarks (p. 64), "God in history is . . . a contradiction, a meaningless phrase" (one knows this type of glib young man), are surely, despite their eminence, unworthy of the Professor's steel.

(2) Professor Webb remarks (p. 104): ". . . there is no sufficient evidence that Christ is risen which would convince a doubter altogether apart from a perception of the quality of that life the secret whereof is found by those who partake of it in 'the power of his resurrection.'" That being so, ought we not to go two steps further and say quite clearly

(*a*) that no one but a Christian can be a competent historian of Christian origins, and (*b*) that Christians are not called upon to accept the conclusions of non-Christian historians and critics ?

E. EVANS.

DIE ABENDMAHLSFEIER. By R. Hupfeld. Verlag Bertelsmann. Gütersloh. M. 7.50.

Dr. Hupfeld, Professor of Theology at Heidelberg, has written a most moving book on Eucharistic problems in Protestant Germany. The situation is distressing. The percentage of communicants to Church members falls steadily. To take some examples: Schleswig-Holstein has 12 per cent., Brandenburg-Saxony 19 per cent., Brunswick 15 per cent. Referring to *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* we discover that the proportion of Evangelical Church members to the population is 93, 86, 89 per cent. respectively, in spite of the *Kirchenaustritt*, which enables one to escape the legal Church dues. When all has been said regarding the lamentable state of Protestantism in Germany, the fact remains that the proportion of communicants to the total population is better than the Church of England can usually claim.

The reasons for the falling off are found in the Lutheran conception of the Sacrament. It is primarily an act of obedience to the Lord, such as did not appeal to the autonomous man of the nineteenth century. Also in it the words "for the remission of sins" are of paramount importance. Now that the idea of God's requiring the blood of Jesus has faded from men's minds, forgiveness associated with the Blood is not so much valued. The stress laid on the preliminary service of preparation and absolution, generally held the day before, robs the Sacrament of its attraction. Why are two rites of forgiveness wanted ? And the whole sense of community-feast is lacking when the service is attended by some only of the general congregation.

On the other hand, there is a new hunger for the Sacrament outside the parish churches, in the many Conferences which are held. And National Socialism, with its sense of corporate life, is a more fruitful soil for revival than the old individual autonomy.

Dr. Hupfeld, after diagnosing the situation, studies the original rite, which he finds to have been a Messianic common-meal of thanks and joy, continued in the Acts with eschatological direction, which St. Paul associated too exclusively with the Last Supper and the Cross. Return to the original purpose of the Eucharist gives the clue to the detailed measures of reform which constitute the remainder of the book.

W. K. LOWTHER CLARKE.

OUR PERSONAL MINISTRY. By T. W. Pym, Chaplain and Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. S.C.M. 4s.

A good many clergy never get to close quarters with their people. Sometimes it is owing to shyness, more often it is due to preoccupation with the management of a parish, but most of all it is attributable to the consciousness that they would not know how to deal with individuals if they had the opportunity.

Mr. Pym's book is therefore a valuable reminder that personal dealing

is the priest's job. He is not ordained to be a successful financier or an able provider of entertainment, but he is to be a shepherd, and the shepherd knows his own sheep by name. If Mr. Pym's book puts young clergy on the right track, and recalls older ones to it, it will serve a most useful purpose.

Mr. Pym's style is easy, and at times breezy, and his method of imparting instruction is likely to reach a wider public than would be attracted by more technical works on Moral Theology. A number of admirably commonsense counsels are conveyed, and we would especially recommend the study of the chapter entitled "Good Listening," as well as that on "Emotion." Greatly daring, Mr. Pym writes a chapter on "Women," but without, if we may venture to judge, throwing any new light on the subject!

Mixed with many wise admonitions are some more questionable observations, and if we draw attention to these, it is not to overlook the real merits of the book.

Is it really true, for example, that the children of to-day get far more individual attention from their parents than in the days when larger families were the rule? It is very doubtful. Again, we do not feel certain that it is wise to "ration" a sinful habit, as counselled on p. 82. "Tapering off" may be advised in cases of, *e.g.*, over-indulgence in alcohol, but our experience has not led us to believe in its usefulness. "All or nothing" appeals to most men. The suggestion that the penitent may select his own penance, though allowed by Lehmkuhl and other writers on Moral Theology, is not one to be recommended. The sort of little conversation after a confession which may easily arise in such a case is far from profitable. Far better for the priest to set a penance in accordance with what he believes to be the right principle and leave it at that. Incidentally our confidence in a doctor would be shaken if he began discussing with his patients the sort of medicine they might prefer! But Mr. Pym warns us against pressing too far the analogy of the priest and the doctor. He himself, however, falls into a similar error in his parallel between Confirmation and Marriage. He argues that both need extended preparation by the priest. It does not follow that because both are sacramental ordinances both require the same degree of preparation. The parties are of different age in the two cases, and there are a host of other considerations which break down the parallel. However, there *is* need of preparation, and Mr. Pym's first chapter on this is useful, but the second one devoted to this topic is highly disputable. Let the idea spread that the clergyman is in the habit of giving "straight talks" on sex, and a number of undesirable results will ensue. There will be the danger of scandal, not to be lightly regarded even in these days of frankness; there will be the peril that certain types of person will waylay the clergyman purposely to discuss such topics. And there is a danger of loss of that influence which rightly belongs to the priest in the spiritual sphere, but is promptly discounted when he steps outside it to deal with questions on which he can claim no expert knowledge.

The excellent chapters on Prayer and Preparation for Communion conclude a book the value of which is out of all proportion to its size. It is a stimulating and suggestive piece of work.

M. DONAVAN.

PAX DEI. An Approach to Mystical Theology. By Patrick Cowley. S.P.C.K. 4s.

As the Bishop of Southwark points out in his Foreword to this timely volume, there is considerable danger nowadays of our forgetting that Christianity, although it necessarily involves that love of our fellow-men which finds expression in personal kindness and social service, is something much more than mere philanthropy. It is essentially a definite relationship to God revealed in Christ as active love, and it issues in a life lived in thankful response to that love.

The great tragedy of Western, and to an ever-increasing extent also of Eastern, culture is that it is pagan in character. Men no longer are interested in the deeper things of the spirit. It is secularism that is dominant to-day. Things are aimed at which are quite good in themselves, but are useless for the true development of the world. A new world is planned which is altogether materialistic and utilitarian. But the only forward movement of the world, the only true progress is the Christward movement. Back to Christ! Back to the Christian message! The warning is needed, "What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world, and yet lose his own soul?" It is of no avail to have a good world if there are no good men and women in it. The only hope is the Kingdom of God. Men must live not merely for this world so as to make of it the best that it can be, but for the other world, which is his true home. Not that the present world is Buddhist-wise to be altogether despised and disregarded, but that it is to be seen in its true perspective.

With these beliefs, and starting with this point of view, the author attempts to guide ordinary folk to-day to participate in "those vitalizing convictions of the saints and heroes of our Faith, without which religion becomes no better than 'morality tinged with emotion' or evaporates into an artificial and deadening pietism."

The title of the book is the actual subject of the first chapter only; but the whole work is pervaded by the theme of the Peace of God. The other chapters deal with the Revelation, the Loneliness, the Way, the Holiness, the Worship, and the Vision of God.

There is a misprint on p. 31 and in the Index. The name "Camfield" is wrongly printed "Camford."

H. S. Box.

LA RÉACTION PAÏENNE. Étude sur la Polémique antichrétienne du Ier au VIe Siècle. By Pierre de Labriolle. Pp. 520. Paris: L'Artisan du Livre. 1934. 40 fr.

The works of Professor De Labriolle of the Sorbonne have reached a goodly number of volumes since in collaboration with Ferdinand Brunetière he wrote about Vincent of Lerins, and his *Life and Times of St. Ambrose* and *History and Literature of Christianity from Tertullian to Boetius* have both been translated into English. The same lot is hardly to be expected for his two books on Montanism since they extend to nearly 1,000 pages, though *Les Sources de l'Histoire du Montanisme* (Paris: Leroux) might well find a place in a larger number of English libraries. Whether or not his new study of the Pagan Reaction during the first five centuries will be more fortunate it is hard to say; but it is certainly one which English theological students would find profit in reading, and the subject, as he points out, has not been dealt with as a whole since "les essais conscien-

cieux et incoordonnés de l'anglican Nathaniel Lardner" in the seventh, eighth, and ninth volumes of his *Credibility of the Gospel History* which began to be published in 1727, and is now usually relegated among ourselves to the inglorious obscurity of the top-shelf, the basement, or the fourpenny box. This does not mean that the problems at issue have received no attention in the books ordinarily available for English students: widely as Professor De Labriolle has cast his net, there are still notable omissions in his interesting bibliography; but the progress of Christian thought is at times exaggerated and in some respects distorted by being judged in isolation or envisaged against a background of which the importance has been imperfectly understood. "L'incuriosité païenne à l'égard du christianisme naissant," which is the theme of the author's first section, has found an unfortunate counterpart as the result of this neglect, except perhaps in relation to the "Mystery Religions," which have been employed for purposes of controversy with a zeal by no means always according to knowledge. At any rate his own readers can promise themselves that they will find him a more inspiring companion for a journey than Rutilius Claudius Namatianus, of whom he speaks in a later section in terms of perhaps undue depreciation. The test, and it is not an unfair one, to which a work of this kind must be subjected, is its success or failure in leaving on the reader's mind a sense that the pagan writers with whom the author is dealing would have recognized themselves in the picture that he presents. By a choice, which carries a quip that is perhaps accidental, the first two sections are "Des Origines jusqu'à Celse" and "De Celse à Origène," and the student who considers how large a part of his knowledge of Celsus is derived from the quotations of a critic will recognize the difficulty of reaching a fair view where information has to be gathered from writers of inferior calibre to Origen, and the author's final chapter on possible gleanings from "Quæstiones"—a subject which deserves greater attention than it usually receives—shews how much that would be interesting to modern scholars has gone almost beyond recall. The central sections on the Hellenic reaction and the "opposition intellectuelle" which continued after the Empire had become nominally Christian cover ground which, except in relation to the career of Julian, is not as a rule very carefully surveyed for English students, and may well serve as an introduction to themes which will set younger men on some useful lines of investigation. Much has necessarily to be treated cursorily, and even the twenty-eight pages on St. Augustine and the Paganism of his time have to be subject to a certain measure of reduction as to the quantity allowed to Augustine himself. But even where, as in this case, and some will add that of Ammianus Marcellinus, the writer may leave the reader wishing that he had been more generous in his allocation of space, the necessary limitations of treatment in a work of this kind may make it all the more stimulating to any who have once been gripped by the interest of the subject. And it may serve to set some English students on larger enterprises than are usually encouraged by the limitation of time imposed by the curriculum for a research degree.

CLAUDE JENKINS.

JOHN THE BAPTIST. A modern interpretation by Margaret Goldsmith. With wood engravings by John Farleigh. A. Barker. 7s. 6d.

The four wood engravings by Mr. Farleigh are futuristic, and to them we may apply from another angle the comment of Abraham Lincoln.

That comment was that for those who like this kind of thing, this is the kind of thing they will like. That comment does not quite apply to the text, for it is plain that Miss Goldsmith is a woman who has bestowed considerable pains on the work she has written. She clearly regards St. John the Baptist as a true fanatic who towards the end had lost the noblest possession of a fanatic, his faith. We cannot prove that the author is wrong in this attitude, but equally she cannot prove that she is right. Conceive the position of John the Baptist in gaol. He is cut off from his work, which meant more to him than life itself. Herod has defeated him. Can the king also defeat the mission of the ascetic? He cannot bear this idea, and he despatches his two followers to ask his cousin, Jesus Christ, if He really is the Messiah. Jesus Christ gives him a list of the works He is executing, and they are all the labours of the Messiah. Surely we are at least as much entitled to draw the conclusion that John in gaol received confirmation that his work would continue, and that when his head fell in the dust, his cousin would make it more enduring than ever he had made it. The man who could say, "He must increase, I must decrease," was built in no common mould.

R. H. MURRAY.

THE VISION OF PIERS PLOWMAN. By William Langland. Newly rendered into modern English by H. W. Wells. Sheed and Ward. 8s. 6d.

When the extensive popularity of *Piers Plowman*—to which the forty-five extant MSS. testify—ceased in the later sixteenth century, it was primarily due to the then archaic nature of its language. It came, in other words, to be a closed book to the public. With the revival of interest in the nineteenth century this defect was by no means rectified, and all credit must therefore be rendered to Mr. Wells for accomplishing the laborious undertaking of a verse translation, and thus making it available outside the restricted ranks of privileged scholarship. He has taken text B as the basis of his work, and incorporated the happier passages either omitted by Langland from text A or added in text C. Objections may be raised, no doubt, regarding this jumbling of the texts, or, again, from the more agnostic disciples of Professor Manly regarding Mr. Wells' tacit assumption that all three texts were written by one man instead of five as suggested, but no one, I imagine, will care to question the probability of Wells' version remaining the standard translation as Skeat's has remained the standard text. If a certain licence has been inevitably necessary in translation of individual words and arranging of lines and selection, it is well to remember that Langland himself wanted, above all things, to be understood; he was never obscure, and when quoting Latin invariably appended a translation for his humbler readers.

Unlike the Gallic inclinations of his contemporary Chaucer, Langland remained faithful to the Germanic alliterative metre of his ancestors. This Mr. Wells has endeavoured to retain. There is always a tendency in this kind of thing in modern English for the cæsura to elide and the line to subside as a result into a mere jingle. There is also the danger of artificiality, due to the exigencies of versification, overriding the major considerations of the tone of the poem. To say, however, that Mr. Wells has, except in a few isolated cases, avoided this, would not be doing

justice to a poem which on its own technical merits continually reaches a point of extreme phonetic beauty. For comparison I will quote parallel versions of the well-known opening of the Induction:

> In a somer seson—whan soft was the sonne,
> I shope me in shroudes—as I a shepe were,
> In habit as a heremite—unholy of workes,
> Went wyde in this world—wondres to here.
>
> (SKEAT.)

> In a summer season when the sun was softest,
> Shrouded in a smock, in shepherd's clothing,
> In the habit of a hermit of unholy living,
> I went through this world to witness wonders.
>
> (WELLS.)

Langland with his religious enthusiasm, his passion for moral reforms, and his mental propensity for hallucination belongs to a race of ecstatic contemplatives not uncommon in the Germany of his day, and the Vision he dreamed "on a May morning on a Malvern hillside" can alone challenge Merswin's *Book of the Nine Rocks* for the title of "the mystic apocalypse of the fourteenth century." In the English field he bears kinship to Rolle, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Fox, Wesley, and, most of all, to Blake by virtue of a militant Christian Socialist element absent in the case of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century mystics; as a sustained composition of allegorical mysticism *Piers Plowman* finds comparison alone in *Pilgrim's Progress*, and possibly to-day in the work of that semi-Christian, semi-pagan mystic Theodore Frederick Powys, with whom Langland bears similarity through their mutual approximation to the ways of thought of that fourteenth-century sect of the Free Spirit which was eventually condemned for its Pantheist tendencies.

Mr. Coghill of Exeter College, Oxford, has prefaced the volume with a few essential facts, and Messrs. Sheed and Ward are to be congratulated on the general production.

J. KAESTLIN.

SERMONS ON THE OLD TESTAMENT. By H. L. Goudge, D.D. Skeffington. 3s. 6d.

Sermons on the Old Testament—with the exception, perhaps, of the Psalms and the Prophets—are much less frequently preached nowadays than used to be the case. There are several reasons for regretting this. It is enough to point out that, as long as the Old Testament as a whole continues to be publicly read in our services, it is obviously important that it should continue to be explained in our sermons. In this volume, from which sermons on the Psalms and the social teaching of the Prophets have been deliberately excluded, Professor Goudge provides seventeen admirable examples of the manner in which the Old Testament may be expounded to a modern-minded congregation. In particular he is concerned to shew that the Old Testament "is not the story of an alien people; it is the early history of our forefathers in the faith, and of the Church to which we ourselves belong." While avoiding mere rhetoric and "purple patches," he makes the ancient stories and characters vividly real, and derives from them instruction relevant to our present needs, both individual and ecclesiastical.

ALEC VIDLER, O.G.S.

BOOK NOTES

The Church and the Boarding School. By E. E. Winter. Philip Allan. 2s. 6d. This is not one more study of the well-worn subject "Public School Religion," but a diagnosis by the Bishop of Chichester's Chaplain for Boarding Schools of the present situation in regard to their religious teaching, with suggestions for a syllabus. The writer has first-hand knowledge of the diocese with probably the largest number of Anglican schools. He points out that religious teaching depends entirely on the personality of the Head. In the main it is unsatisfactory, but unfortunately the parents are content with things as they are.

From Monk to Busman. By B. G. A. Cannell. Skeffington. 5s. net. An autobiography of a doctor's son who went as a boy to Father Ignatius' monastery at Llanthony, left it and became a bus-conductor, served in the war, returned to his job, helped in Church work, and still more in labour politics, and is now a member of the London Diocesan Conference. The writer has no literary skill, but his record has the charm of sincerity and reality.

Little Sermons on Life. By L. B. Ashby. Skeffington. 3s. 6d. *Thoughts on the Gospels.* By M. O. Blakelock. Skeffington. 2s. 6d. Most of the sermons in the first book have appeared in the *Morning Post*, where they have been much appreciated. Mr. Blakelock's thoughts are very brief indeed. Neither book is in the least theological.

Method in Your Prayers. By A. F. Thornhill. Blackwell. 2s. 6d. Short and simple, but full of meat and with no short cuts. Presupposes Bible study.

The Art of Living. By J. Wall. Skeffington. 3s. 6d. Fifty-two short talks for the Sundays of the Christian year, which will be helpful to those who feel that a very short address, which inevitably cannot treat serious problems seriously, is all that can be attempted on Sunday mornings.

Sermons for Town and Country. By J. A. Craigie. Skeffington. 6s. These are longer, but constructed on a similar plan. One is tempted to say that the preacher could think of all this for himself, but apparently he does not, and therefore such helps are necessary.

More Talks on Confirmation. By F. B. Flint. Skeffington. 2s. This volume is designed primarily for adults.

W. K. L. C.

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